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New Democratic Party Leader Discusses Policies

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in English 1800 GMT 9 Sep 90

[Interview with Democratic Party leader Zach de Beer, moderated by Clarence Keyter, South African Broadcasting Corporation correspondent, with journalist Anne-Marie Mischke of RAPPORT in the Johannesburg studio and Ormando Pollok of the NATAL MERCURY, in Cape Town studio—live]

[Text] [Keyter] Good evening, and a word of welcome to Dr. de Beer, Anne-Marie with me and Ormando in Cape Town. Doctor, if I may start off. The headlines in today's papers following your two-day congress: ANC [African National Congress] Sword Hangs Over Party. PFP [Progressive Federal Party] Lives on in the DP [Democratic Party]. Whistling Past the Grave. Anger DP Purge Threat. And, it still goes on and on. Are you and the Democratic Party not clinging onto the last straw, according to these headlines?

[De Beer] The Democratic Party and I have just had yet another enjoyable congress. As many of the press reports to which you have just referred indicate, we have a reputation for this sort of thing. Whether it's good or bad, we can debate if you wish, but we all always do it.

[Keyter] Anne-Marie?

[Mischke] Dr. de Beer, when the DP was founded about 18 months ago, we had the impression that a new vibrant party has seen the light, and at this last congress we got the impression it might just have been the old PFP all over again. What are the differences between the DP of today and the PFP of two or three years ago?

[De Beer] Well, first of all, to pick up the obvious point you're making, there is still a very considerable percentage of the former Nationalists who joined the DP, who had never been DP, are still there. [sentence as heard] I would say among the leadership figures, the overall majority, Wynand Malan has gone, that is true. There may be one or two others, I can't think of them for the moment. Everyone else was there. I think that what has happened is that we aren't facing an election. We aren't on the hustings fighting for votes, fighting for political power. We are back, concerned with values. The values that you see leading the Democratic Party are the same ones that led the PFP, or otherwise there never would have been a Democratic Party.

[Pollok] Doctor, could I come around to one of the particularly messy incidents at the congress, the one surrounding the question of dual membership? It was a fairly messy debate. I think there might be some confusion as to exactly what the party's position is in this, and possibly you can clarify it for us.

[De Beer] Yes, I must agree it was a messy debate, and at one stage we actually accepted an amendment, which we shouldn't have accepted, which would have had quite the wrong effect. But we got it quite straight now. Our position

is that basically you can't belong to two political parties. You can't do it anywhere, you can't do it with any political party I know of. However, South African politics is in an enormous state of flux at the moment, and one reason why it's in the state of flux is that the largest actor in the game is not a political party. The ANC is not a party. In fact were told at the congress that it's a loose coalition of forces opposed to apartheid. I've never heard it so described before, but that's what we were told.

Now, what happens is that certain people who believe in our principles, who want to belong to our party, are under very considerable pressure to belong to the ANC, too. So, we adopted the position that anyone who joins another party or organization without the consent of our National Council forfeits his DP membership thereby.

[Pollok] In fact, Doctor, what you're really saying here is that some people could belong to another organization, when some couldn't. Is that not discrimination in itself?

[De Beer] No, because each case will be considered on its merits. And it's only when somebody is subject to abnormal pressures and could be penalized in an unpleasant way if he didn't belong to another organization, and when we are satisfied that his loyalties are with us that we'll let him belong to us.

[Mischke] So that would perhaps mean that some of your members wouldn't be able to have dual membership that easily.

[De Beer] I would say a very great many of our members can't have dual membership.

[Mischke] For instance?

[De Beer] Somebody living in comfort and ease in a nice white group area, with no pressures of any kind, who simply thinks it's trendy to belong to two political parties, will be asked to make up his or her mind.

[Pollok] Doctor, would the party allow them dual membership, say with the DP and the ANC, even though there are very strong differences of principles in fact between the ANC and the DP?

[De Beer] Only under the special circumstances I've just described.

[Keyter] But Doctor, isn't that a sure recipe for conflict in the party?

[De Beer] No, I don't think so. I think you'll find that in practice these will be quite a small number of cases. The work of interaction and reconciliation is going on. You must realize that when a liberation front is a liberation front, it attracts people who have a wide range of ideological preferences. When that liberation front has to cease to be such a thing and becomes a political party it has to sharpen up its policies. It then loses the people who don't agree with the policies it adopts. The ANC is only just beginning to enter on this process.

[Keyter] We are talking about the ANC all the time but what about the 20-30 percent, in your own words, of DP members and supporters whom you've lost to the NP [National Party]?

[De Beer] I am naturally very sorry we have lost them but since Mr. de Klerk has seen fit to accept about 90 percent of our policy the world would be a totally illogical place if some of the people who voted for us last year didn't go back to him. They left the Nats [National Party] because it was still an apartheid party. Now, thank heavens it isn't an apartheid party so they are accepted again.

[Mischke] Doctor, if all these policies of yours have been accepted by the National Party why on earth have we still got a Democratic Party?

[De Beer] Because there is still the other 10 percent and it's important. In particular, I want to know from the National Party what they mean when they talk about minority protection. They talk about it a great deal, they lay great stress on it especially when they've got some CP's [Conservative Party members] in their audience and they won't tell us what they intend. Of course, if the National Party reaches the stage when it's accepted all of our policies, I'll join it or I'll do a deal with it just as I did a deal with the NDM [National Democratic Movement] and the IP [Independent Party] a year ago.

[Pollok] Doctor, you say that the National Party has adopted 90 percent of your policies, but you yet insist on remaining as an independent party, retaining your own identity. Are you in fact saying that you don't really trust the state president's bona fides to go right through with his policy of reform and change?

[De Beer] Now you must not challenge me to be personally rude to the state president because I am not going to do that. What I am going to say is that I break faith with my own supporters if I do a deal with a party which is still vague about policies which are of very great importance, and begging their pardon, both the Nats and the ANC are vague about a great many of their policies.

[Keyter] Anne-Marie?

[Mischke] You have mentioned at the congress that your party is going through difficult times. You have mentioned your financial problems. You have mentioned the flow of members to the National Party and there might even be a flow of members to a certain degree. What are your hopes for survival under these circumstances?

[De Beer] It's very important to me that my party should survive and do well but it's much more important to me that South Africa should survive and do well and the major task for the Democratic Party is to play its vital role as the only standard bearer of liberal democracy in the negotiations which lie ahead now. None of us know how long they will take, a year or two years. At the end of that time we will know what the new South African constitution is going to be and then there will be large scale political realignments with the Nationalists looking for black members, us looking for allies, the ANC doing heaven knows what. The important

task is not keeping the DP alive in an old fashioned sense of white politics. It's playing your role in a vital transition period in South African politics.

[Keyter] Do you think the DP is going to last that long, Doctor?

[De Beer] Yes.

[Keyter] On what basis do you say that, Doctor?

[De Beer] Because it has a lot of very fine South Africans in it and a great many very fine supporters.

[Mischke] But having attended your congress this weekend, Ormande used the word messy just now, that's just one description of certain of the discussions, but another word would be a certain feeling that you haven't got direction or vision. It seemed to be like a party that didn't really know where it was going. How it should tackle the immediate future. Was that impression wrong?

[De Beer] That impression is entirely wrong. We know precisely how we want to tackle the immediate future. We want to tackle it by playing, as I said a moment ago, a decisive role in the negotiation process in support of liberal values which we stated over and over again with the greatest clarity and which were accepted unanimously by the congress.

[Mischke] But how is it going to happen in practice, this decisive role? I mean, you've mentioned it but it's not very clear exactly what you plan to do.

[De Beer] How does a party operate in practice? A party has public representatives, and it has local elected leaders, and all these people do their thing as members of the party. How the negotiations are going to work in practice is not entirely in my hands, but certainly, we have the state president's assurance, given again and again, that we are going to be there. We are going to be part of it.

[Pollok] Doctor, in the various debates there were very clear divisions and obviously points of difference within the party over a variety of issues. The party then appeared to placate or handle problems by satisfying everybody. Somebody said it was a typical ou SAP kongres [old South African Party congress]—all things to all men. How do you react to that charge?

[De Beer] Ormando, I have been attending political congresses for close on 40 years, and you for quite a substantial part of that time, and in fact you've seen them at more parties than I've seen them, and I have never seen a political congress of any party that wasn't placating the two wings of the party. [sentence as heard] That's what you do at a congress. It's what it's for.

[Keyter] Doctor, wouldn't you admit that you veered off a serious split at the congress in a short term, and it's inevitable that you are going to have major splits to either right or left in the very near future?

[De Beer] No, I see no likelihood of a major split in either direction. If you say to me: Will a few members of our party decide that they prefer Mr. de Klerk because he is now becoming so liberal or decide that they prefer the ANC because it's looking so democratic, that may happen, and as I keep repeating to you the really important thing is not even what happens to the Democratic Party. It's whether South Africa is going to be liberal and democratic.

[Keyter] So in your own mind you are saying that we are prepared to live for another two years or 18 months, and then if the DP goes, that's fine.

[De Beer] I am saying that when the negotiations are completed and you can see the outline of the new constitution, and I don't know whether that is eighteen months or two years or longer, but let's agree, after a certain period, there are going to be massive realignments. I will prophesy that not one of the present South African political organizations, except perhaps the Conservative Party, will remain in the same form that it is now.

[Mischke] But on the left-hand side of your party there seems to be a group of members who want to be more actively involved, whom one could perhaps call activists, who might be very unhappy in this cozy, liberal atmosphere the DP is trying to create. Are you optimistic that you could keep those people in your party for two years?

[De Beer] You've said that these are people who want to be actively involved without spelling out what you want them to be actively involved in. If you mean interaction work, if you mean talking about South Africa's future together with people in the ANC, the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], all sorts of organizations, the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement] for that matter, getting together with people in other parties and trying to work out solutions that might be acceptable to us all, well, then I wish that we were all activists like that and I hope we are.

[Pollok] Doctor, could I just get away from the straight political aspect here? One of the important things which came up at the congress was your new social market economic policy, which seems to have many good things in it directed at the right line: end poverty—you can't have freedom while you have poverty and all that. There seems to be very little about it, and one wonders if you could clarify some of the points of it?

[De Beer] Oh, I'd love to. I mean the social market economy is an area where I really am very much at home. The important thing when you talk economics is to avoid the -isms. Don't let's talk in terms of capitalism, socialism, of all the slogans. The important thing is say what you want to do, and firstly you want to grow. You want rapid economic growth because only in that way can you create the assets which make it possible to redistribute. Secondly, you want to uplift the poor. You want to give people who don't have a fair chance in life a fair chance now. It's no good going for the redistribution of existing wealth because there isn't enough of it. It would achieve nothing except to demotivate some of your leading people. What you have to do is make the

money first, and you can only make money by free market methods, by market based economies. The whole history of the 20th century shows this. When you've done that then you can start spending that money for the upliftment of your poor and the improvement of your community, and we call it the social market economy for one simple reason—that that phrase, social market economy, was manufactured to describe the West German economy 40 years ago, and it always has described the West German economy. We want people to know what we are saying. So we say, if you want to see what we are striving for, look at West Germany.

[Keyter] Doctor, if you say that that's what the DP intends doing, what makes you so sure that you can do it if the government is battling apparently to do this—more or less what you are trying to do?

[De Beer] I am never very sure that I can achieve what I set out to do in life. That doesn't make it less valid to set yourself a goal to strive for. The second part of your question: Why do I think we could do what the government has failed to do is precisely because the government made a howling mess of our economy in every possible way, until about two or three years ago, when to Mr. du Plessis' credit and the credit of other people they began to turn round. Then for the first time they tried to bring government expenditure under some kind of control; then for the first time they started to control the money supply which they had never done previously. Then for the first time they began to contemplate eliminating wasteful expenditure on apartheid, although heaven knows, in the main that's still going on. I don't say the government would never achieve what were setting out to achieve. I say they have singly failed to do so for 40 years.

[Pollok] Doctor, in investigating this policy and trying to apply it to our own local conditions here, I presume one would have canvassed all sorts of opinions. Would these have included people such as Nelson Mandela, the ANC, PAC, COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions], whoever else?

[De Beer] I don't think we bothered Mr. Mandela personally, but yes, certainly we talked to those organizations.

[Pollok] And are they happy with what you've produced?

[De Beer] Oh no. The ones you've mentioned are all socialists. We're not socialists, and I don't think you are.

[Keyter] Anne-Marie?

[Mischke] How often do you talk to the ANC, and I don't mean individual members? I mean the party leadership. What is the contact between your party and the ANC?

[De Beer] Well, for example, I have only talked once to Mr. Mandela since he came out of jail. It was a long interview, a properly structured conversation. That is entirely because his program is what it is. I can't simply thrust myself into it, but Mr. Sisulu I talked to first before he went to jail in 1960, and we've seen each other a number of times since he came out. I've seen Mr.

(Mhlaba) I've seen Mr. Govan Mbeki, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Dr. Pallo Jordan. You know, you name it, we've talked to them. As regards large-scale conferences, we had one organized for the weekend of 1 and 2 September which, regrettably, the ANC felt it had to cancel. That was a pity. I've already taken steps to have discussions set up to try to organize something of the sort.

[Keyter] Doctor, my last question. At the congress, if I remember correctly, a resolution was scrapped that meant to actively recruit black members. It was just left aside. Yet, in an interview after the congress you said that you were going to change the party's structures. Did you adjust that?

[De Beer] Yes, all those who asked for the scrapping of that resolution—I am sure that you listened to them as carefully as you always do listen—said there is no need for the resolution because any party goes out to recruit members, and every one of those people said we shall—we personally—shall recruit members. They said they didn't want a resolution giving them detailed instructions, and when I thought about it, I thought, hell, what's politics about if it isn't about recruiting members. So we shall recruit members. We don't need that resolution to help us do it.

[Keyter] It was my last question but just to follow on that one, aren't you competing with other parties in the time to come, parties and organizations who will probably show the same values as you?

[De Beer] Yes, we are competing with other parties and those parties may, in the time to come, your phrase, come to share our values, and when they do we'll stop competing with them.

[Keyter] Orlando?

[Pollok] Doctor, just on this line it's a fairly interesting concept in sharing views and values and getting people to your way of thinking, but do you possibly see a situation developing here around the negotiating process, similar to the DTA [Democratic Turnhalle Alliance] getting involved with a variety of parties all under one hat but not exactly the same, all talking together?

[De Beer] I think the DTA option is certainly one through which we may go. I think, probably, if you have a DTA situation, it will tend to develop towards a single party later on somewhere, but I think it's a very constructive thought, that in the midst of the search for a new South African constitution, parties which are separate should work together wherever they share common convictions.

[Keyter] Last question Anne-Marie.

[Mischke] Dr. De Beer, your party is an open party. It has actually always been open, but when you look at the congress, when you look at the membership it seems to be a very white party with just a bit of pigmentation here and there. Is it going to remain white like that, or do you foresee that it could really become a nonracial party in the true sense of the word?

[De Beer] I certainly foresee and strongly hope that it is going to become highly nonracial. I agree with you. It is much too white today, just as the National Party is hopelessly too white today, and a white party has no future in South Africa if things go the way we think they are going to go, but the major reason why our efforts to develop in black and brown communities have failed, has been the tricameral parliament, which has made it so extremely difficult to work as a single unit. We all anticipate now that we are going to have a universal franchise and a common role, and that will be a new ball park, and in it we will be able to play a new ball game. Not just us, the Nats also.

[Keyter] Dr. De Beer, on behalf of Orlando down in our Cape town studio, Anne-Marie with me, thank you very much for your time and enjoy your overseas trip.

[De Beer] Thank you very much.

COSATU Calls Three Days of 'Mass Action'

*MB1009201390 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1941 GMT 10 Sep 90*

[Text] Johannesburg Sept 10 SAPA—COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] is to embark on three days of "mass action"—a one-day stayaway on October 8 and two days of "factory-based action" on October 9 and 10, the trade union federation announced on Monday [10 Sep].

According to a decision taken at the weekend by 300 COSATU delegates from affiliates and regions, the decision was a result of the government's "refusal to meet COSATU's demands on labour legislation and to pressurise the government to take effective action to end the violence".

"We see a close link between the violence and the refusal of the state to meet our demands on the LRA (Labour Relations Amendment Act)—both are attempts to undermine democratic organisations and curtail the growth of a strong united working class," COSATU said in a statement on Monday.

It said a working party was established at the end of June to try and resolve the deadlock between the union movement and the state.

Among the demands put by COSATU were that the LRA should be extended to farm workers, domestic workers and public sector workers; labour legislation must have the support of workers before it goes to parliament; a "fairer, quicker and cheaper labour appeal system" should be legislated.

"As far as COSATU is concerned the government has made no decisive moves to meet COSATU's demands. In addition the state did not meet the 30-day deadline which they had agreed to. As a result the conference had no alternative but to decide on mass action.

"We want our stayaway to be a clear signal to the state that we are not prepared to get involved in ineffective talk shops. If we go the route of negotiations, the state must be prepared to make genuine and fundamental changes.

"It is only mass action that will force the state in this direction."

Angola

KUP Commentary Stresses Need for Peace

MB0809172890 (Clandestine) KUP in English
to Southern and Central Africa 1630 GMT 8 Sep 90

[Commentary: "What the MPLA Tries To Hide With Regard to the Question of Peace in Angola"]

[Text] Jamba, Sat. September 08.....[dateline as received] The negotiations process for peace in Angola has a history which is a little bit long and full of incidents.

The great turning point, in approaching the Angolan problem, is the Gbadolite conference of June 22, 1989, at [words indistinct] heads of state proclaimed, before the world, their profound desire to see Angola at peace and national reconciliation among Angolans, ceasefire between the two belligerent parties, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] and the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], negotiations for the solution to the whole conflict under the mediator of Zairean president, Field Marshall Mobutu Sese Seko, achieved. Although immense political and diplomatic efforts were exerted by various African heads of state, chiefly by the Zairean president, the Gbadolite meeting brought with it certain germs of confusion and ambiguities because the previous conference held in Luanda on May 16, 1989, at which a big number of MPLA's friends took part and which advanced wrong political theses which did not contribute towards solving the Angolan problem. It is thus that, in Luanda, the integration of UNITA and its forces into the MPLA's institutions, clemency and amnesty for UNITA militants and combatants, on individual basis, into the MPLA society, had been decided.

The most serious thing is that this conference of May 16, 1989, abusively decided on the so-called exile of our beloved president.

Despite these positions not having been approved at Gbadolite, they constituted the background screen for the MPLA and its faithful friends for any political step to be taken, taking advantage of certain gaps which might exist here and there. It is enough to see what happened to the Gbadolite declaration where controversy arose with regard to the supposed secret agreement, which never existed as far as UNITA is concerned.

The pretence to give a more detailed political content of the Gbadolite conference, greatly reduced the value of the declaration.

Let us take a look at the cycle of the negotiations. At the first round of the negotiations, the MPLA delegation tried to derail the process by avoiding to establish a realistic, profound and wise agenda. The MPLA tried to avoid to recognise the other belligerent party at the table by referring to the UNITA delegation as Angolan brothers, despite the fact that the problem of reciprocal

recognition was being raised with regard to the official recognition of the negotiating parties.

The biggest worry of the MPLA delegation all along the course of the negotiations which followed, with no tangible results from the national point of view, has been the discussion of the ceasefire in Angola without clear political principles. With this tactic, the MPLA delegation would like to maintain the ambiguity of the political objectives to be discussed in conference.

In this way, it would then speak of the ceasefire in what they called purely technical terms while the political context of the MPLA would still be the sum up of the May 16, 1989 resolutions. Only the three principles of Gbadolite had value for UNITA. It is true that the negotiations are in a terrible impasse due to lack of realism on the part of the MPLA delegation. The MPLA had wanted to ceasefire in order to implement clemency, amnesty, exile and the whole range of wrong and narrow-minded decisions.

At the time of the negotiations, even before Gbadolite, the MPLA puppets were preparing an all-out military offensive to annihilate UNITA. This is the logic of negotiations for the MPLA.

Fortunately, all these manoeuvres were discovered in time by the official mediator in the Angolan conflict, President Mobutu Sese Seko and gave UNITA reason.

At the moment, the MPLA manoeuvres are repeating themselves, although the concepts have here and there another nature. The eighth point of the nine points presented in Evora by the MPLA delegation for the ceasefire says:

Declaration of ceasefire on the basis of acceptance of the announced principles. What principles? We ask.

Recognition of the Angolan state, was later on also extended to the incumbent head of state, MPLA president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos. Other points were mentioned such as national reconciliation in the fifth point, the creation of conditions for the holding of general elections in the sixth point and the development of the national army in the fourth part. In the MPLA's erroneous logic, the thematic for the destruction of UNITA did not miss in the nine points. [sentence as received] It now presents itself in a form in which it talks about adequate treatment in the case of the UNITA president.

The MPLA conditioned the question of ceasefire, on a series of principles which were debated and amended during the course of the negotiations. It is thus that after a meeting of the third round held in Sao Joao da Barra, the UNITA president, presented the five points aimed at moving forward the Angolan peace process. These principles had great support from the national and international public opinion, as well as the United States of America and other interested powers.

Summed up in five points, UNITA fundamentally requests that there should be reciprocity in recognition

and transparency in the application of the principles of multipartyism, which means, the setting up of a date for elections in Angola and a return to democratic life.

There should not be any other atmosphere other than that of cooperation and understanding, already that UNITA has taken positive and significant steps vis-a-vis the MPLA's complaints with regard to the recognition of the Angolan state and of Jose Eduardo dos Santos as president.

Surprisingly, there wasn't and there is still no concrete step whatsoever towards UNITA by the MPLA, which is delaying the movement towards peace.

The recognition which UNITA asks from the MPLA is not a simple declaration of intent, but a serious position in which recognition has to have a political content, as a substantial part in solving the Angolan crisis.

What would have happened if the MPLA manoeuvres had not been discovered?

It would have been a capitulation type of ceasefire with all the bizarre and peculiar ingredients.

Firstly, one party would have signed without its signature having any value because it was not recognised and had no possibility of making its voice heard in the midst of its forces. Secondly the MPLA would have soon after that said that the political principles to be applied for the ceasefire were to be those of the May 16, 1989 with all their clemencies, amnesties and exiles, also considering UNITA as isolated elements who would be individually absorbed in the state structures of Luanda.

With the ceasefire flag, the MPLA would only have tried to take advantage and persuade the friends of UNITA, mainly the United States, to cut-off aid to the resistant organisation. And it would have been in the same framework that foreign companies would have been encouraged to pour in money into Luanda's coffers, not actually to serve the people of Angola but to bribe Angolans and feed the theft we are presently witnessing.

Nevertheless, serious negotiations required, first and foremost, total and solid engagement under the principles to be applied in the country by giving political significance to the ceasefire.

The Angolan problem requires a serious, profound, calm and realistic analysis instead of running away from responsibilities.

The MPLA or the Government of the People's Republic of Angola should explicitly and officially recognise UNITA as a political opposition force as the first step in the solution to the war in Angola.

This recognition must have political substance, and not a simple formality, a folklorist type of declarative.

Democratic peoples of the world, chiefly the United States of America, our good will and flexibility for the

solution of the Angolan problem is a concrete fact which cannot be doubted. We are ready to discuss peace in Angola and contribute, in a concrete way, toward peace in Angola. We want national reconciliation with the holding of free and fair multiparty elections in Angola now. We want that arms should quieten down in Angola with a new completely open political situation, in the democratic exercise. We do not want the episodes of 1975, where so much was written and promised but was not complied, to be repeated.

Today, we can defend the profound aspirations of the Angolan people and do so with determination and dedication we enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of the Angolan people. [sentence as received] Our friends and allies should not be deceived by anybody. They have already done a lot and they should now continue to aid UNITA in order to ensure the victory of freedom and multiparty democracy in Angola.

If there are negotiations for the Angolan problem, it is because UNITA is in a position of strength in which it cannot be crushed militarily. A weak UNITA is practically an invitation to the MPLA not to negotiate and, instead, to launch new military and genocidal offensives. Our allies should reinforce UNITA's military, political and financial potential in order to ensure negotiations.

Angolans, UNITA militants, be vigilant against the MPLA regime's dilatory manoeuvres which are only designed to hoodwink national public opinion in order to avoid negotiating seriously. The cause which we defend is a just one and will win. We should all unite around our beloved president, Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, and let us follow his voice of command, which is the only one which will lead us to salvation, national unity, genuine national reconciliation, real peace and the progress and happiness of every one.

Long live genuine freedom and multiparty democracy.

UNITA now - forward. UNITA now - cohesion. UNITA now - quickly.

* Air Link Between Namibe, Namibia Announced

90AF0573C Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 29 Jul 90 p 3

[Text] Namibe—The Yuri Gagarin Airport in Namibe Province (coast), on which reconstruction work has already been completed, will now have night flights and regular connections with Namibia, Paulo Cassoma, minister of transport and communications, announced in this city.

Paulo Cassoma made the announcement at the end of a working visit to Namibe Province from 12 to 14 July.

Speaking with the local press, the minister said that the commercial port would be relieved of the present passenger terminal and the fishing port, to provide more space for deep-draft ships.

To this end, he said, piers will be constructed in Iombwa; the project will involve several companies; specifically, Sonangol, Porto, and Capitania, and the ministries of Fisheries and of Transport and Communications.

The transport minister also announced the creation of an association of private truckers, which, in a first phase, will facilitate the transport of merchandise to other provinces that constitute the southern front.

* Rise in Mental Illness Noted

90AF0573E Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 26 Jul 90 p 3

[Text] Agostinho Fernandes, deputy director of administration of the Luanda Psychiatric Hospital, said Tuesday in this city that the precarious social conditions of its citizens is behind the increasing number of mentally ill in Angola.

Speaking with the Angolan news agency ANGOP, the official added that the war, the rural exodus, drug consumption, unemployment, the misunderstanding of the meaning of freedom, and the shortage of material goods are choking the psyche of the citizen.

Of the mentally ill who are proliferating in Luanda City, Agostinho Fernando said: "It is not solely the responsibility of the Health Ministry to bring them into the hospital."

Regarding the current situation at the hospital, the administrative deputy director said the facility has a 90-patient capacity. He explained, however, that because it takes in patients from other provinces, the current figure is 145 patients.

The hospital has only two physicians and 35 nurses—a very small staff for the number of patients.

According to Agostinho Fernandes, a mental health program sponsored by the WHO will be initiated in 1991.

* Delegation Meets Businessmen Based in Zaire

90AF0573B Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 29 Jul 90 p 3

[Text] Kinshasa (special ANGOP [ANGOLAN PRESS AGENCY] envoy)—A group of Angolan merchants and businessmen based in Zaire met on Wednesday with the Angolan delegation at the CEEAC [Economic Community of Central African States] trade fair. During that meeting, they voiced their concern about the dearth of information available to them about their nation's economy.

According to the merchants and businessmen, the Angolan community in Zaire lacks information about the Angolan economy, particularly the Economic and Financial Reorganization Program (SEF).

Nsanda Martin, chairman of the committee of the federation of Angolan merchants in Zaire, explained that they had not received any documentation to date about the new legislation already approved within the framework of the SEF, primarily the Foreign Investment Law.

This lack of knowledge has made it difficult for this community to keep abreast of the current economic situation in the country, so they are asking the government to assign someone [an economic attache] to the diplomatic mission in Kinshasa.

Nsanda Martin noted that the meeting was the first of its kind between the Angolan delegation and Angolan merchants settled in Zaire, in which various doubts were dispelled and their concerns about the current economic process in Angola were addressed.

Sita Joao Maria, chairman of the Angolan delegation and the commercial director of the Ficom [International Trade Fair], said on that occasion that the concerns voiced by the businessmen would be conveyed to the highest officials of the Angolan Trade Ministry, so that ways may be found to assist them.

One of the major concerns expressed was the problem of trade on the Angolan-Zairian border. The businessmen asked that a legal framework be defined for such trade because, as it stands now, the government has lost a considerable sum of money which could be entering the state's coffers in the form of duties.

The exportation of dried fish and salt to Zaire and the role of the Angolan Chamber of Commerce and Industry were also concerns brought up by the merchants. The businessmen expressed an interest in joining the Chamber.

As members of the Angolan delegation, Valdemar do Santos, representing the Ministry of Fisheries, Miguel Gombo, who represented the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Carlos Diogo, deputy general director of the Ficom, gave detailed answers to the questions of the Angolan businessmen in Zaire.

The meeting, considered highly important, enabled the Angolan commercial delegation to learn about the problems that this community faces and promised that their concerns would be conveyed to the government.

On that occasion, Sita Joao Maria presented the merchants with several works of Angolan literature, so that this community would not be so far removed from the reality of their country. He invited the businessmen to visit Angola this November, for the next edition of the Luanda International Fair (FILDA).

*** SADCC Defines High Priority Projects***90AF0573A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 29 Jul 90 p 3*

[Text] Simba Makoni, executive secretary of the Southern African Development Coordination Commission (SADCC), said yesterday in Luanda that the rehabilitation of the Govi dam in Huambo Province and of the Lobito and Namibe "corridors" are high-priority projects.

In a press conference in Luanda at the end of his two-day visit, Simba Makoni stated that, although it is a new project for the SADCC, the Govi dam project merits the highest priority because it is extremely important for the development of energy and agriculture in Angola and Namibia.

The Govi dam was the target of an act of sabotage by rebels of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] at the beginning of this year. At that time, the Angolan Government launched an appeal to the international community to assist in restoring the dam—a matter of interest to Namibia, as well.

The Lobito corridor, budgeted at \$570 million, and the Namibe corridor, which will be put up for international bids, are important for the development of the transport system of southern Africa, specifically for Angola, Namibia, and Zambia.

The executive secretary of the SADCC argued that setting priorities for the projects is a matter that depends on the member countries, but that it is necessary because of the lack of financing to cover all the projects listed on the action program of his organization.

Regarding the admission of Namibia to the SADCC, Makoni said it would be facilitated by the simplicity of the organization's structures and he announced that in its next meeting, in August in Gaborone, the Council of Ministers would decide on what sector the young country will coordinate.

According to the structure of the SADCC, each member country coordinates one of the nine sectors that have already been created; for example, the energy sector was assigned to Angola.

Asked about the changes in the economy of the countries in the region and in the politics of the donor countries, Makoni was not too concerned about a reduction in aid.

Simba Makoni explained that the most important thing for the SADCC countries will be the proper management of the aid provided and action by the member countries themselves to finance some projects.

He also divulged that the member states are working in conjunction with the organization in the process of regional integration, which will encompass economic, commercial, and fiscal areas.

According to Makoni, the creation of a monetary union of the SADCC states is the highest point of economic integration, but achieving this is still a long way off.

He added, however, that this has already been approved in a document entitled "Policies and Strategies for the Industrial Development of the Region," which provides for the forms of regional economic integration.

Simba Makoni admitted that he might stand for another three-year term during the next summit meeting of the SADCC in Gaborone, which will elect a new executive secretary for the organization.

At the end of his visit to Angola, Makoni traveled to Havana, where he will take part on Monday and Tuesday in a meeting in preparation for the meeting of the South-South commission in Caracas.

*** Kwanza-Norte Cotton Production Compromised***90AF0553D Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 19 Jul 90 p 2*

[Article by Isidoro Natalicio: "Cotton Production Jeopardized"]

[Text] As part of the activities for the 1989-90 agricultural year, the provincial enterprise for the supply of equipment and materials in Kwanza Norte, AGROTEC-UEE, supplied to Luanda 450 kilos of various horticultural seeds, under a plan established by Angosementes at a ton and a half; it also provided small amounts of batata rena [a kind of potato], maize, beans, and peanuts, all of Portuguese or Dutch origin.

These provisions may meet local needs, since organized agricultural activity is, for political and military reasons, limited to only three municipalities (Cambambe, Cazengo, and Lucala), out of the ten municipalities into which the province is administratively divided. A certain skepticism as to the ability of these seeds to germinate is prevalent in the agricultural agencies in the green belt, because of the poor germination of seeds in past years, a situation which has never been satisfactorily resolved.

Added to these factors is the fact that the use of fertilizers is extremely limited, as is the stock of seeds for farmers and peasants, because of recent droughts. There is a scarcity of fertile land in the municipalities of Cazengo and Cambambe, but there is good land in Lucala.

It is estimated that at least a third of the fertile land in these municipalities is underused by the owners, in view of the various, complex problems facing them, which mainly have to do with using equipment such as motorized pumps and mechanization.

There is a glaring shortage of fuel, and in the three regions there are fewer than 25 motorized pumps, all with small cylinders. There is virtually no mechanization, since the enterprise handling this aspect fell to pieces. Of the more than 60 machines it had, nearly all

are shut down, since they were always used by untrained persons, and they were poorly maintained because of a lack of spare parts and adequate labor.

In this area, farm labor and clearing of the land are done manually. Despite the assistance of the EDA's [rural development stations], the imposition of technically ill-advised crops and the ensuing resistance on the part of small farmers have also hampered agricultural development.

In the midst of all these shortcomings, the 2,231 small farmers in Lucala, who are grouped together in 31 related structures, have been the best off throughout the past five years. They have received some technical and material assistance, including two vehicles, equipment, and seeds from the Dutch nongovernmental organization (ICO), at a total value of 504,645 Dutch florins.

An expert from that institution visited the province and studied the feasibility of implementing the second stage of the program.

In the meantime, work needs to be done on resolving the most important problem related to the activities developed by the farm agents, namely marketing in rural areas, as this problem is so widespread that it is affecting all the development work being done. The unprecedented disorganization of the commercial enterprises involved in this process, their failure to fulfill their plans for the circulation of goods, and the constant thefts registered have made it completely impossible, to inject the appropriate quantity or quality of goods into the region, given the wide range of products produced by the small farmers.

This situation has led these enterprises to contract astronomical debts, just as they are about to disappear under the plan to scale down the size of the government enterprise sector, as advocated by the SEF [Economic and Financial Reorganization]. "This time we are going to market our products by a system of exchange with firms in Luanda and, if necessary, we will place all of them on the parallel market," disclosed some ranchers, farmers, and peasants who are extremely upset over the current situation.

The marketing crisis in rural areas in the region has already had an impact. The cotton crop has been wiped out in the municipality of Lucala. Referring to one of the reasons underlying this situation, the report of the local Agrarian Development Institute (IDA) for the 1988-89 crop year states in one passage: "With the production of a cotton crop in the municipality for the first time since independence, some of the farmers became distrustful... The government created famine among them, because since they were growing cotton, they did not have time to grow other crops. The distrust was further aggravated by the policy of allotting one hectare for each farmer, and in return only a meter of cloth would be placed in the typical baskets they carried for their supplies."

Some basic commodities, primarily sugar, soap, salt, dried fish, oil, wine, and cloth, among others, would be included in their baskets; these goods would be distributed during the most important times of the crop season, and specifically during sowing, weeding, and harvest time. In good times they did not need as much, so it was decided that for every hectare cultivated, each peasant would receive five kilograms or meters of each product.

On the basis of this, last year out of the 250 hectares planned, only 63 were cultivated, and as a result only 11 tons of cotton were harvested, an amount which does not even represent 70 percent of the anticipated yield of 600 kilograms per hectare. The cotton production figures in Kwanza-Norte, similar to those in the other provinces involved in the national cotton production program throughout the country, and especially in Malanje and Kwanza-Sul, contradict the thinking of deputy agricultural minister Joao Jardim. "The People's Republic of Angola will no longer need to import cotton, but will be exporting it in the short or medium term," he said when he was in this city in 1988.

Meanwhile, for the 1989 fiscal year, the enterprises ENCODIPA [National Company for Marketing and Distribution of Agricultural Products] and EREMISTA [Semi-Public Retail Company for Domestic Commerce], which operate in rural areas, collected 597 tons of products, including beans, manioc, fruits and vegetables, citrus fruits, potatoes, and coconuts.

The figures were higher for the banana crop, with 163 tons, 500 kilos marketed, while the lowest figures were for batata rena, recorded at three tons, 800 kilograms and produced only in Lucala. The municipality which did the best was Cambambe, with a total volume of 384 tons, 99 kilos and the worst was Lucala, with 78 tons.

However, these figures are relative and not absolute, since they do not cover the products that farm agents channeled to the parallel market.

* Delegation Visits Drought-Stricken South

90AF0573D Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA
in Portuguese 29 Jul 90 p 3

[Report by Luisa Rogerio]

[Text] Much has already been said about the drought in Angola. But it is an inexhaustible topic.

There are not enough words to express the real size of the problem. The most recent data present a picture that is not only tragic but truly alarming. The situation holds out no promise of being easily turned around; even official spokesmen have admitted that the phenomenon has reached catastrophic dimensions in recent times. In the south of the country, specifically in Cunene and Huila provinces, at least 1,000 people have already perished and almost half a million head of cattle have met the same fate.

To observe at first hand the effects of this drought that has gone on for four years and to look for ways to aid the victims, the Angolan Ministry of Foreign Relations organized a visit to these provinces with representatives of the diplomatic corps. The delegation included Jose Guerreiro, vice minister of foreign relations for cooperation; Per Lindstrom, Francesco Lanata, and Stanislas Filliol, ambassadors, respectively, of Sweden, Italy and France; Matheu Ganda, acting representative of the United Nations in Angola; and other individuals connected with international agencies.

In Cunene Province, the first one to be visited, the delegation had an opportunity to see the ruins of the war, the ravages of the bombing that left the people economically and socially at square one. Aggravating the situation, the rainfall has been declining sharply since the beginning of 1986. This natural disaster, if we consider it as such, brought with it the drought and, consequently, the hunger and malnutrition that are affecting more than 200,000 inhabitants, or two-thirds of the total population, as well as the cattle—the principal source of income in the region—and other species.

Thus the drought is the principal challenge to the local governments, which are also confronted with a prior but no less serious problem: the restoration of the infrastructures and reconstruction of the principal localities that were destroyed by the war.

According to a study entitled "Famine, Studies and Statistics," dated November 1989, the central authorities were alerted to the fact that Cunene Province was most seriously affected by the drought, not only because of ecological and natural conditions but because it was the target of destruction by the South African troops during the second invasion, in August 1981.

However, according to Pedro Mutinde, provincial commissioner of Cunene and member of the MPLA-Labor Party Central Committee, Cunene Province is currently benefiting the least from the emergency programs of the UTA/E [expansion unknown], although the latter is already in possession of data that more accurately reflect the developing situation. Under the circumstances, failure is to be expected.

Immediate Consequences

The consequences of the irregular rainfall recorded in some areas are not cause for hope. They already point to the loss of the scanty crops which would normally mature when the rain falls at the proper stage of their growth; this happened only in the northern zone of the province. These crops, considered subsistence crops, do not meet the needs of a normal household even when the rainfall is regular. To date, a loss of more than 50 percent has already been confirmed, which gives some idea of the situation.

In this regard, two types of criteria have been used in defining priorities for providing assistance to the neediest. The first consists in identifying localities which, for

one reason or another, have been more seriously affected. Six municipios were identified as presenting the most serious picture: Curoca, Cahama, Cuanhama, Ombadja, Namacunde, and Cuvelai, with about 353,000 inhabitants. There have been 61 deaths attributed to the famine, while more than 3,000 head of cattle have died.

To date, 318 deaths have been registered as a result of malnutrition, with the greatest incidence in Curoca Municipio, with 174 victims. It may be stated that from the first quarter of 1989 to February of this year, the drought and its repercussions have taken 379 lives.

From all indications, if measures are not taken to alleviate the tragedy, the problem will worsen in the next 18 months, because, in addition to the poor crops, in some areas the people have no reserves.

International Food Aid

The Angolan authorities have spoken repeatedly of the situation. They have sought aid from the international community, which has sent various kinds of donations. Cunene Province received 2,500 tons from the CCIC [International Catholic Center, UNESCO] and from Carc/Australia. The products are being distributed to the neediest population, at the rate of 10 kilograms per person.

Meanwhile, despite the excellent international aid, immediate measures are needed, because the meager crops harvested in Curoca, Humbe, Ombadja, Otcinjau, Cahama, Evale, Nehome, and Cuanhama municipalities call for immediate intervention. Even in the locales where the rainfall was greatest, the crops do not meet the needs, so more than 300 lives are threatened.

The water shortage, the major difficulty in southern Angola, is another part of the problem that demands a solution. More than a third of the 400 wells that existed before national independence are out of operation. Immediate intervention in this area is absolutely essential, to save the region's more than a million head of cattle and two million goats.

It is noted that Cunene Province has enormous hydric and agricultural potential, based on the river of the same name, one of the most important waterways in Angola, where agricultural projects have been located and studied since colonial times. According to the provincial commissioner, the projects should be resumed. Technical and material assistance is needed, true, but everyone is aware that the projects would contribute to achieving food self-sufficiency for the region in the future.

During the visit to Cunene Province, the members of the delegation met with the people, who informed them of the present situation and of the problems. In conversations with the local officials, the delegation members studied the possibilities for providing more support to

the drought victims. Their ideas should be refined and forwarded to the governments and agencies which they represent.

Other Implications

The visit to Cunene gave an idea of the extent of the human capacity for resistance, or how far desperation can lead one. They told us, for example, of a man who committed suicide because, more than his own suffering, he could not bear to witness the suffering of his animals in an area where herding is the primary activity.

The herdsmen have sought ways to alter the situation and to prevent the worst. Namibia has been the salvation, a kind of promised land. Traveling through the province, one sees thousands of head of cattle moving south. It is estimated that close to 200 animals cross the border every day—a figure which, according to local sources, does not reflect reality, because there is no real control of the border.

In addition to saving the herd and improving the food situation of their respective families, the herdsmen say they are getting a fairer exchange in Namibia. They are demanding quantity, quality and diversification in the products [for which they bargain] because, after all, food is not the only thing they need. There is a shortage of almost everything, from bread to clothing.

However, although the descent to the south is a partial solution to an immediate problem, it creates a concern that is growing with the passing of time. If the migration continues at this pace, there is a risk of a drastic reduction in the size of the herd in Cunene. It is unlikely that the situation will change, however, because the government can offer no alternatives. At least this is what is suggested in practice. With regard to rural marketing, for example, albeit the methods are not very satisfactory, there has been no trade for some time [simply] because of the shortage of products.

In any event, in southern Angola, on roads that were once bombed out, you see all types of merchandise being transported, from electric refrigerators—acquired by people who live in an area where there is virtually no electric power—to luxury automobiles. In this regard, a certain herdsman acquired a car in exchange for a determined number of head of cattle. The irony is that the car is still in Namibia because its new owner does not know how to drive.

The drought is a constant presence. When we were traveling the almost 100 kilometers between Xangongo (the provisional capital) and Ngiva, a colleague absent-mindedly tossed his cigarette butt on the ground. This immediately resulted in a small fire, attesting to the dryness of the grass.

One can also spot countless dry wells and animals searching for watering places. On occasion, human beings and cattle bathe together in the same water that

they will drink from minutes afterward, embodying a brotherhood in truly dramatic fashion. A black picture, certainly, but it is real.

Donations Not Enough

We noted earlier that the Angolan Government has appealed to the international community. Tons of food and medicines have come in from all over the world and from international agencies, destined for the drought victims. The goods reach the recipients and after they have consumed them, they begin looking toward the Port of Namibe, waiting for the next ship, when they are not awaiting the trucks from Botswana. Or else they do as they did in the beginning; they go in search of roots, leaves, and unfamiliar, generally dangerous plants, in a desperate attempt to alleviate their hunger.

In other words, we cannot continue to rely all the time on international donations. A realistic strategy must be defined to overcome the tragedy and suitable mechanisms must be created immediately to confront other ills.

It is within this framework that a forum on the drought and desertification is scheduled in October. Through this forum, the intent is to conduct a technical meeting, with international agencies and organizations participating, to analyze the economic, social and environmental effects of the drought in the most seriously affected regions. The forum will also serve as a means of identifying, drawing up the terms of reference, and mobilizing the financial and material resources for the execution of projects.

For now, the food needs are skyrocketing. It is utopian to think that the most critical phase has passed, since the experts warn that the future looks bleak. Many people's lives are endangered.

Botswana

* Masire, Nujoma Issue Joint Communique

90AF0633A Gaborone DAILY NEWS in English
20 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by Mpho Maine: "Masire and Nujoma To Strengthen Ties"]

[Text] Windhoek—the President Dr Quett Masire and President Sam Nujoma have said it is their duty and desire to strengthen and consolidate the existing political and socio-economic relations between Botswana and Namibia.

According to a joint communique issued at the end of Dr Masire's 5-day state visit, the two countries exchanged views on a range of bilateral, regional and international issues.

Agreements and a protocol of understanding were discussed and concluded.

The first agreement was for the creation of the Namibia-Botswana joint commission of cooperation and the second an agreement on cultural and education cooperation.

The protocol of understanding is on defence and security.

"A desire was expressed by both heads of state that the joint commission of cooperation, composed of ministers of the two countries, should meet as soon as possible to address priority areas of cooperation," states the communique.

It says there are such areas as the development of transportation and communications links and in particular, the implementation of the Trans-Kgalagadi and the Rundu-Katima Mulilo highway projects and the initiation of direct commercial flights between Gaborone and Windhoek.

The other area, says the communique, is the promotion of the trade and commercial relations between the two countries. These will embrace the development and utilisation of water resources with particular reference to the Okavango water system and common underground water reserves.

The promotion of joint programmes in the areas of veterinary control, nature and wildlife are also to be looked into including the exploration of possibilities for joint promotion of tourism and other marketing arrangements, it states.

Incorporated in the agreement is the initiation of cooperation in the field of energy and mineral exploration and development and the two leaders also undertook to encourage joint studies and research programmes aimed at strengthening the capacities of the two economies whilst exploring the potential for greater economic integration.

The cultural and educational cooperation agreement aims at promoting and facilitating cooperation between the governments and nationals of the two countries in the fields of culture, education, science and technology, art and sports.

This agreement will encourage increased contacts between scholars, students, artists and sportsmen of the two countries and facilitate the recognition of diplomas, certificates, and university degrees obtained in the respective countries.

Through this agreement, the two countries also committed themselves to providing facilities and scholarships to students and scientific personnel of one country to study in the institutions of higher learning, vocational centres and research laboratories of the other country.

The communique says the protocol of understanding on defence and security aims at cementing the relations between the two countries and providing for lasting peace and security of the two countries.

It also provides for cooperation in combatting poaching as well as for consultation and agreement on procedures for the extradition of criminals.

On regional issues, the two leaders said they were encouraged by the steps taken by President F.W. De Klerk in releasing several political prisoners, including Mr Nelson Mandela.

Noting their encouragement at the dialogue between the government and the ANC [African National Congress], the communique says the two leaders expressed a fervent wish that this process should enhance the commencement of serious negotiations aimed at establishing a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa.

Mauritius

* Labor Shortages, Costs Threaten Tea Industry

90AF0595E Port Louis LE MAURICIEN in French
9 Aug 90 p 6

[Article by Dharmanand Dhoocharika: "Tea Industry in Crisis—2,000 Small Planters Furious"; first two paragraphs are LE MAURICIEN introduction]

[Text] Some 2,000 planters and farmers in the tea industry are threatening to abandon the land on which they grow tea because of the serious lack of manpower and the high production costs. The area of land under tea cultivation has been reduced from 8,672.88 acres in 1987 to 8,019.75 acres (3,385.5 hectares) in 1988.

In a statement made yesterday to LE MAURICIEN, small-[volume] planters and farmers from Belle-Rive, Bois Cheri, Corson, La Chartreuse, Nouvelle France, and La Flora criticized the Ministry of Agriculture, Fishing, and Natural Resources for failing in its task to save the tea industry.

In spite of the establishment of the Mauritius Tea Development Authority Federation and the Grand Port/Savane Credit and Tea Marketing Cooperative Federation, the small planters feel threatened.

"It is true that the climate is favorable for growing and producing tea. The price of tea is not guaranteed on the foreign market. We cannot invest in a slowly dying sector. The authorities in charge of the Tea Board and the Ministry of Agriculture did not deem it useful to publish the report on the 'Tea Industry Efficiency Study,'" stated Mr. S. Bholah to LE MAURICIEN.

The minimum price for a kilogram of tea leaves is set at 2.00 rupees. Some 5,436,339 kilograms of tea were exported by the local authorities in 1988. Of these, 187,200 kilograms were sold on the London market. The small-[volume] farmers are requesting that the minister of agriculture, Mr. Madun Dulloo, enter into new negotiations with the importing countries, specifically the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union, to obtain a guaranteed price.

The small-[volume] planters and farmers feel that new markets will have to be found to export Mauritian tea.

According to estimates from these farmers, some 1,134,126 kilograms of tea (blended packeted teas) were sold on the local market in 1988 compared to 998,429 kilograms in 1987. They noted that there is a 13.6 percent increase in tea consumption at the local level.

In this context, the planters are demanding another increase in the price of tea.

"With the price explosion for several basic commodities, we are no longer able to make our family budget balance. The subsidies granted to the planters by the Ministry of Agriculture are not adequate. The production cost is too high. In spite of the introduction of mechanization in the tea sector, we are still faced with the problem of manpower," the planters told us.

* ADB Grants Loans for Development Projects

90AF0595D Port Louis L'EXPRESS in French
4 Aug 90 p 6

[Unattributed Article: "Mauritius Assured of Receiving 100 Million Rupees from the ADB"; first paragraph is L'EXPRESS introduction]

[Text] Agriculture, training, the environment and industry will be the beneficiaries.

The African Development Bank (ADB) will grant loans for an overall amount of 100 million rupees to the Island of Mauritius over the next three years. This sum will be targeted for development projects in such priority sectors as agriculture, training, the environment, and industry.

This has resulted from the current visit of about 10 executive directors of the ADB. However, no specific project has been identified at this stage. The main objective of ADB's factfinding mission in Mauritius is to find sectors that deserve its financial support.

Learning

The ABD mission has also had several meetings with officials from the government and from the banking and private sectors, noted Mr. D. Manna from the Ministry of Finance, and alternate executive director of the ABD. "We wanted to come here in order to learn more about the Mauritian economy," stated Mr. H.M. Mapondoo, one of the executive directors of the ABD. The discussions between the ABD and the Mauritian authorities have been very beneficial for both parties, he said.

Progress

The ABD is very happy with the progress and positive development experienced by Mauritius over the last few years. It is also satisfied with the completion of projects financed by the bank, he added. "The Mauritian economy has made great strides and is now ready for its

next phase of development," added Mr. Mapondoo. He stressed that the ABD is ready to help the Island of Mauritius with its future development.

Loans

Since 1975, Mauritius has benefited from 13 loans from the ABD, for a total amount of 1.7 billion rupees. Among the projects financed by this African banking institution one should note, among others, the construction of the Grande-Riviere bridge, road repairs after cyclone Claudette came through, credit lines granted to the Mauritian Development Bank, and the installation of a hydraulic system in Port Louis.

Today, the ABD has 76 member states, the last of which to join was Namibia. Among them are 51 African and 25 non-African countries. It was established in 1964 and Mauritius has been a member since 1973. The ABD is headed by 18 executive directors, 12 of whom are African and six non-African.

* Rapid Intervention Brigade Goes Into Operation

90AF0595B Port Louis LE MILITANT MAGAZINE
in French 28-29 Jul 90 p 6

[Unattributed Article: "A Rapid Intervention Brigade Set Up"]

[Text] The Rapid Intervention Brigade, a special squad developed by the police, will be operational as of next week. Led by Inspector J. Unmar of the Crime Prevention Unit, this brigade will consist of approximately 100 policemen and will have about 20 new vehicles at its disposal. "This brigade will operate on a 24-hour basis from certain points throughout the country, which are considered hot," Police Commissioner M.B. Kowlessur told LE MILITANT MAGAZINE.

According to the police commissioner, this specially equipped brigade will be able to intervene rapidly to provide assistance to the public when they have become victims of theft, break-ins, and crimes. "Patrols, both in vehicles and on foot, will be maintained in troubled areas—hot spots," said Mr. Kowlessur. The members of the brigade will also help the public with traffic accidents.

Mr. Kowlessur stated that the individuals attached to this brigade will not have to concern themselves with paper work.

Mozambique

* Situation of Exile Community Analyzed

90AF0583A Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese
11 Aug 90 p A4

[Article by Tomas Vieira Mario (representative of the Mozambican Information Agency in Portugal): "What Mozambican Professionals Abroad?"]

[Text] The idea of a Congress of Mozambican Professionals Abroad, scheduled for October in Lisbon, could only have arisen because important sectors of Portuguese society continue to think of the "Five" as a homogeneous group, with the same kind of domestic problems which, for that reason, can be resolved on the basis of the same political formula. Otherwise, one might wonder why, in the case of Angola, it was Angolans who organized their Congress and, for Mozambique, it took a "Movement for Peace and Democracy in Mozambique" (inspired, formed, and directed by deputies in the Assembly of the Portuguese Republic) to promote an initiative of the same sort?

Along the lines of the event last April involving Angolan professionals abroad, the promoters of this meeting are planning to gather in Lisbon Mozambicans with some technical training who, now that their country is at peace and political reforms are being implemented, may be willing to return so that they can contribute their technical know-how and participate in the glorious challenge of national reconstruction—regardless of their political ideas or philosophy.

Now, since the promoters of the initiative (the "Movement," made up of Portuguese politicians and parliamentarians, with some "independent" Mozambicans invited, prominent among whom is Domingos Arouca, the designated chairman of the Congress) have already announced that the event is to take place in October, one would think that they would have first confirmed that an event of this sort is justified, and that it is equally justified that Portugal act as host, because of the fact there are large numbers of well-educated Mozambicans living there. This is not the case.

And in our opinion this is evident because the "Movement" does not have—or appear to have—a very strong belief in the mobilization for this "cause," either among Mozambican professionals, a considerable number of whom are known to be living in other European countries, the United States, and also in some African countries, such as Kenya, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, or among those who are living in Mozambique, who, for that reason, are better informed of the actual situation in the country. Either that, or the "Movement" has neither the means nor valid information as to who these Mozambican professionals living abroad are or where they can be found.

In contrast to Angola, the Mozambican diaspora, even after 25 April 1974, was virtually never in the direction of Portugal initially: immigration to Portugal is a quite recent phenomenon, it is numerically insignificant, and it is more linked to the process of decolonization itself than to temporary departures for political reasons or because of the war.

Numerous sources consulted confirm this, including the following: the general 1970 census data for the population in Mozambique; a study on the so-called "returnees" conducted by the Development Research Institute

(IED) in Portugal; and, an in-depth study by A. Rita-Ferreira in 1986, entitled "Mozambique After 25 April: Reasons for the Exodus of the Population of European and Asian Origin," among others.

Putting all this together, the information from these sources indicates that there was a total of 158,000 Europeans (including 25 different nationalities, besides the Portuguese) living in Mozambique four years before 25 April 1974, out of whom 154,800 were Portuguese.

Now, according to the INE [National Statistics Institute], in 1981 a total of 164,064 people returned to Mozambique, and there were also several thousand Portuguese who stayed in the country (as Mozambicans or maintaining their Portuguese citizenship), and several thousand others who decided to settle in South Africa or what was then Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), so we know that this figure included a number of Hindus, Pakistanis, and people of mixed blood who were also of Mozambican origin.

These two groups (Asians and persons of mixed blood) numbered less than 60,000 in 1970, since the overwhelming majority of them stayed in Mozambique.

And, again focussing on the "returnees," it should be pointed out that regardless of the political or ideological orientation of Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] when it took power in Mozambique, it was inevitable that at some point in time a large number of these Portuguese would lose their jobs or lose certain privileges that they had as a direct result of the "colonial" status: after all, Mozambique was independent, and politically able to formulate and implement development strategies as a sovereign nation, with different ideas as to the distribution of colonial wealth...

And although it is true that during this process, there were situations that were not altogether unavoidable, which gave cause to many innocent Portuguese to leave the country, that is another subject, the analysis of which, in our opinion, should shed light on the many or few (ir)responsibilities of the Portuguese forces who at that time were managing the process of dismantling the "Empire" in Africa...

Persons Who Were Still Adolescents

Aside from this group of people, who are 60 to 70 years old today, there is another, younger one which, according to INE data, accounted for 30 percent of the total "returnees." We are referring to a group of young people who in 1974 were less than 17 years of age: they were in their final years of high school or freshmen at Lourenco Marques University.

Today they are more like than different from any other Portuguese without any experience with Africa, and they view the possibility of returning with a great deal of skepticism, or, if you want, pragmatism, whether they are Portuguese technicians with Portuguese or foreign companies, the United Nations system, or are working

under bilateral cooperation agreements between Portugal and Mozambique—or even if they are Portuguese businessmen who would return to the land where they were born on a business venture. The rest are adventurers—adventurists willing to take to great a risk.

They would essentially be emigrants, earning money as foreigners and remitting their savings to Portugal.

Thus, contrary to what has happened with Angola, there is no community of Mozambican professionals of any weight in terms of size or quality, who are and regard themselves as Mozambicans.

Just take a look at the most recent figures from March 1990: while the consulate of Luanda's embassy in Lisbon has over 13,000 Angolans registered with it, there are not even 2,500 names on the list at the Mozambican consulate, and the overwhelming majority of them clearly have poor educational backgrounds.

There are obviously historical, social, and sociological reasons for this difference, which have to do with the different methods of colonization used by Portugal in the two cases. First of all, there was a massive migration of Portuguese to Angola, particularly under the policy of Norton de Matos, who served two terms as governor-general of the territory (in 1911 and in 1921). As a result of this policy, either because of the phenomenon of mixed-marriages, or because there was a sizeable African middle-class there after colonization, which was relatively "assimilated" with the Portuguese culture, Portugal was the natural choice of an alternative fatherland for a relatively large sector of Angolan society, whenever they had reason to migrate. Consequently, Angola's internal problems are discussed here with virtually the same keen interest as topics related to life in Portugal—because out of the five PALOP countries, Angola is the one that is the most vivid in the minds of the Portuguese.

A Quiet Community, the Mozambican One

As for the remaining group, the mixed-bloods and blacks—the only reason they made the journey to Portugal was political dissension in their country, such as the case of the persons expelled from Mozambique in 1977, who were accused of being "traitors in nationalities," for having decided to reclaim Portuguese nationality after having acquired Mozambican nationality following independence.

There is also a group without any numerical or sociological expression whatsoever, a group of former officials of the colonial state in Mozambique who, under the legislation promulgated in Portugal in 1975, may be considered as part of the so-called "staff of attaches," who are permitted by law to keep the rights they had as Portuguese government employees.

There are Mozambican professionals living abroad, and their origin and history are intimately linked with the history of Frelimo.

Since there was an extremely small number of Mozambicans with an education of any importance at the time Frelimo was established in 1962, the first large group of national professionals arose in fact with and in Frelimo, and it was on the basis of the movement that, as a result of internal problems, migration to various countries occurred—but not to Portugal.

Through the influence of Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of Frelimo (who would be educated and work in the United States), it was precisely to that country that many students on scholarship in the movement went, thanks to considerable support from Protestant churches, nongovernmental organizations, and foundations which obtained scholarships for young Mozambican nationalists.

The dissidents within this group, some of whom located in Europe (Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and the USSR) is explained by Mondlane in these terms:

"[...] All the students (had to) focus on an education as the way to prepare themselves to return to Mozambique to work, and (they had) to be ready to go back at any moment, as soon as (they were) called. There were major problems with students who pretended not to understand or who refused to return when their education had been completed. Because of these problems, we lost many well-educated people..." (In "Lutar por Mocambique" ["Fight for Mozambique"], Sa da Costa, 1975.)

Information that we have received and confirmed indicates that over a hundred Mozambicans have been living in the United States since 1963-65, and they are former Frelimo scholarship students, who are now teaching at universities, working at prestigious research institutes, or are prosperous businessmen.

Aside from the fact that we question the legitimacy of organizing a congress of Mozambicans, we are doubtful of the ability of the "Movement for Peace and Democracy in Mozambique" to guarantee the participation of all these Mozambicans in the event scheduled for October. And, consequently we are afraid that the congress will end up being taken for a meeting of several hundred Portuguese, divided among those longing to go back to times to which it appears impossible to return, and those who regard themselves as "Mozambican professionals abroad" and have nothing more in mind than to look for possible political means to "obtain an advantage of some sort."

Zimbabwe

Zambia Denies Reports of SA Trade Mission

*MB0709190890 Johannesburg SAPA in English
1858 GMT 7 Sep 90*

[Text] Harare Sept 7 SAPA—The Zambian High Commission in Harare has denied news reports that a South

African [SA] trade mission will be established in Zambia before the end of the year, reports Zimbabwe's News Agency ZIANA.

A spokesman for the commission described the reports as speculative, saying the time was not yet right for such relations between Zambia and South Africa. Zambia solely supported current negotiation efforts, in an attempt to facilitate the complete eradication of apartheid and the establishment of a free, democratic and non-racial South African society, he said.

The news report claimed a South African trade promotions director in the Ministry for Trade and Industry had confirmed the establishment of a trade mission on Wednesday, but official government spokesmen for the two countries had refused to comment on the matter.

* 1990/91 Budget Presented to Parliament

* Report on Chidzero Speech

90AF0636A Harare THE HERALD in English
27 Jul 90 pp 1, 9

[Text] Sales and income taxes will be cut, the civil service trimmed, parastatal losses cut, most price controls lifted and, on 1 October, the long-awaited trade liberalisation will be introduced.

The senior minister of finance, economic planning and development, Dr Bernard Chidzero, announced these changes and outlined how the government would spend an estimated \$9,017,060,000 this financial year when he gave his Budget yesterday in Parliament.

Price controls will, however, be retained on basic foods and other steps taken to protect poorest people from the shocks of adjustment.

This, he said, would end 25 years of unproductive controls on the economy and the protection of inefficient parastatals. That would set the economy on a path of at least 5 percent growth a year to soak up growing unemployment, ensure better standards of living for more people in the long run and strengthen the economy to face the competition from other reforming countries.

Although the reforms planned would bring with them a whole new set of problems and challenges, he said, the government was determined to keep the costs of a change to a minimum and for as short a period as possible. Special programmes would be introduced to help the poor. This, he said, was preferable to the stop-start growth and economic stagnation experienced so far and "there is no going back."

In an unusual move, all these economic policy changes were spelt out in a special economic policy statement on macro-economic adjustment and trade liberalisation given with Dr Chidzero's 1990/91 Budget. Although the statement did not say how trade liberalisation would work in practice, a deadline has not been set.

The Budget itself did not pose any shocks for ordinary working Zimbabweans, promising wide-ranging tax cuts as it did, but economists and businessmen were still busy late last night figuring out its broader implications.

Dr Chidzero announced plans for total recurrent expenditure, including constitutional and statutory appropriations of \$6.5 billion, which is 25 percent more than last year, mainly because of the civil service salary review and parastatal losses.

Investment

The public sector investment programme would total more than \$2 billion, but \$553 million of this would be financed by the parastatals, themselves. As a result, total budgetary expenditure in the year to come would be \$8.2 billion. Total revenue, including international aid grants, would be more than \$6.7 billion, leaving a Budget deficit of almost \$1.4 billion or about 9 percent of gross domestic product. This is 25 percent above last year's actual deficit of \$1.2 billion and 44 percent above the originally estimated deficit of \$989 million.

But Dr Chidzero outlined wide-ranging policies aimed at reducing the major causes of this growing deficit: the size of the civil service and parastatal losses, especially the subsidies backlog.

This, he said, should eliminate parastatal losses and subsidies by the middle of next year. By that time parastatals would be expected to be operating more efficiently and effectively, possibly in joint ventures with outside partners.

"If Zisco's requirements are included, the present subsidy allocations alone account for some 4 percentage points of the Budget deficit in relations to gross domestic product, leaving the deficit as 5 percent... this indicates the importance of the success of subsidies... (which) should ensure the reduction of the Budget deficit to 5 percent of GDP [gross domestic product]."

To finance the deficit, \$117 million will be borrowed abroad and \$1.3 billion from the domestic market and steps will be taken to ensure that this is not inflationary.

Despite the high deficit, he had however, decided to provide various tax concessions because the structural adjustment programme could lead to a doubling of inflation by the end of the year. These concessions would "further increase disposable income and cushion the lower paid from any temporary adverse impact on their standards of living."

Inflation is mainly expected to rise because of the decision to decontrol the prices of all commodities apart from basic foods. The economic policy document said that special steps would be taken to protect the poor from the social effects of structural adjustment.

These would include targeted subsidies to protect vulnerable groups and incentives to small investors to expand and create more jobs. Attention would also be

paid to promoting the informal sector. The government would launch a publicity campaign to keep people informed about how to cope with the changes envisaged.

On the long-awaited trade liberalisation programme, Dr Chidzero did not provide any specifics on how essential imports would be liberalised. But he said the programme would start on 1 October when selected items would be placed on to open general import licence.

Priority would be given to imports needed for production aimed at increasing competitive exports, especially if that production is more labour intensive than capital intensive.

In addition, various export promotion incentives will be strengthened and an export retention scheme will be introduced in which exporters will be able to retain a certain percentage of their export earnings. The government has also accepted the concept of export processing zones of free trade zones.

Steps will also be taken to strengthen the financial sector and make it less "complacent and inactive."

Appropriations Breakdown

90AF0636B Harare THE HERALD in English
27 Jul 90 p 9

[Text]

Vote Appropriations

In the table below, all figures of money are in millions of dollars. The fifth column of figures indicates the ministry's vote of credit.

Vote	1989/90 estimate	1989/90 actual	1990/91 estimate	Percentage inc for 1990/91 on actual	Vote of credit
President	65,179	78,315	83,968	7.2	5,000
Parliament	10,939	10,939	13,083	19	—
Public Service	27,316	28,916	37,280	28.9	800
Defence	840,369	873,455	1,031,070	18	—
Finance, Econ. Plan. and Dev	135,412	127,931	261,814	104.6	25
Vote of Credit	498,278	598,278	781,985	30.7	—
Audit	4,765	4,765	6,130	28.6	—
Industry and Commerce	120,657	120,824	130,598	8	40,134
Lands, Agric. & Rural Res.	378,884	386,384	483,855	26.4	166,526
Mines	39,314	39,314	24,814	-58	304
Transport and Nat. Sup.	326,225	354,165	535,722	51.2	248,868
Foreign Affairs	49,630	58,376	64,975	11.3	—
Local Govt, Rural Plan.	154,547	158,747	201,046	26.6	113,334
Labour, Manpower Plan. & Dev.	33,447	47,518	59,168	24.5	15
Health	352,866	386,228	459,467	18.9	13,872
Higher Education	172,348	172,348	203,141	17.8	1,570
Education and Culture	1,015,221	1,038,094	1,329,074	28	12,040
Community and Co-op. Dev.	22,535	22,535	25,501	13.1	3,056
Political Affairs	17,776	17,776	49,417	177.9	72
Home Affairs	268,179	290,579	327,579	12.7	105
Justice, Legal and Parl. Aff.	58,612	62,723	73,614	17.3	—
Inform. Posts and Telecom.	29,980	32,120	42,350	31.8	67,801
Energy, Water Res. and Dev.	52,787	53,112	101,982	92	84,905

Vote	1989/90 estimate	1989/90 actual	1990/91 estimate	Percentage inc for 1990/91 on actual	Vote of credit
Environment and Tourism	55,839	55,839	65,768	17.7	5,558
Public Cons. and Housing	386,585	386,585	456,876	18	18,000

Constitutional and Statutory Appropriations

The constitutional and statutory appropriations in this year's Budget total \$2,166 million, going up by 18 percent from last year. Constitutional and Statutory Appropriations, which by law should be paid for each

year, include the salaries of the president, MP [Member of Parliament]s, senators, judges, the auditor-general, as well as civil service pensions and servicing of the national debt. The following shows how much was voted for this year (in millions of dollars) and the percentage increases.

	1989/90 estimate	1989/90 actual	1990/91 estimate	Percentage Inc. for 1990/91 on actual
President	0,097	0,107	0,107	—
Parliament	0,120	0,120	0,065	-84,6
Public Service	104,086	126,586	135,086	6,7
Finance, Econ. Plan. & Dev.	1,635,300	1,668,300	1,992,300	19
Audit	0,041	0,045	0,045	—
Local Gov. Rural and Urb. Dev.	0,450	0,475	0,475	—
Labour, Manpower Plan. & Soc. Wel.	37,800	38,466	36,680	-4,6
Justice, Legal and Parl Affa.	1,232	1,447	1,550	7
Transport and National Supplies	0,475	0,475	0,475	—

Allocation for Defense

90AF0636C Harare *THE HERALD* in English
27 Jul 90 p 9

[Excerpt] The Ministry of Defence gets the second largest vote of \$1,031 billion of which \$834 million goes to the Zimbabwe National Army; the bulk of the vote is for soldiers' pay.

The ministry's vote is 18 percent higher than last year's allocation of \$873 million. Salaries for administrative employees go down \$474,000 to \$3.41 million.

The National Army salaries allocation will increase by 32,3 percent to \$525.64 million while allowances will rise from \$46.84 million to \$63.44 million. The army will spend about \$1 million less on motor transport and mechanical equipment and will cut expenditure on project consumables to \$100,000.

Expenditure on the training costs of the People's Militia drops 15-fold to \$20,000 following the departure of Korean military instructors.

The Air Force of Zimbabwe is to spend \$79 million - \$33.7 million more than last year on aircraft procurement, maintenance, modification and running costs. At \$3 million, however, aircraft procurement has been reduced a dozen-fold.

FINANCIAL GAZETTE comment

90AF0636D Harare *THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE*
in English 27 Jul 90 p 4

[Text] The budget statement presented by Dr Chidzero yesterday has been hailed in different sectors as his most positive and boldest to date, and this despite the general crisis of expectation preceding its delivery.

It is a budget that the average man in the street will welcome as his most favourable to date in terms of taxation both direct and indirect. Even Dr Chidzero himself concedes that since 1983 there has been too much belt tightening.

Commerce and industry have generally welcomed the budget which they say augurs well for the country's economy, especially in respect of the definite, and long awaited push for trade liberalisation. Inevitably some in the business sector will say the fiscal aspects of the budget still took second place to the development policy issues. They will cite Dr Chidzero's own words that the economy of the country has been shackled for the past 25 years by controls, resulting in high cost inefficiency. Their own expectations would have been that much more progress would be made towards deregulation and liberalising the economy.

After noting that performance since 1980 had been short of expectations, and that "investment is unacceptably low," the minister said a different policy approach was needed in future. His new aim, a steady 5 percent growth in the next 4 to 5 years, is realistic and attainable with good management and with a little luck thrown in. The minister promised significant changes in the fields of prices, trade liberalisation, labour regulations, incomes policies and investment incentives, but the minister gave few details except in relation to trade liberalisation.

It was important for the increased credibility of the government on the investment drive, and the resulting creation of employment that more definite details should have been made.

In the coverage of investment incentives the minister clearly illustrated the divergence of opinions between the government and the private sector over what is necessary to motivate internal and foreign investment. Dr Chidzero felt that government had done much already, with the new investment rules, the adherence to MIGA and OPIC and the establishment of the Investment Centre. He announced no new incentives beyond promising to look at "flexible remittance arrangements." Businessmen feel strongly that more, perhaps much more is needed before the incentives begin to provide motivation. Zimbabwe's investment incentives are demonstrably the worst in the SADCC, while Africa as a whole is way down on most priority lists for investment. If Zimbabwe does not only match, but significantly improve on the advantages of investing in Eastern Europe and the Pacific rim countries, can we really be taking the game seriously?

On the revenue and expenditure accounts and the key issue of the magnitude of the budget deficit, the news was unpalatable but predictable. Prefacing his remarks by indicating that government was looking at ways of recovering costs in primary education, reducing the size of the civil service by a restructuring exercise, and forcing the parastatals to achieve at least a break even by 1994/95, the minister had his listeners expecting action in reducing the deficit. But this was not to be. With the aim still to reduce the deficit to 5 percent of GDP by 1995, government expenditure in 1990/91 has been allowed to soar by an estimated 25 percent, and with the deficit rising to \$1,430 million it will be over 9 percent of GDP.

Education expenditure has been allowed to rise by 28 percent, health by 20 percent, and although there is a greater emphasis on capital expenditure than last year, and money has been allocated to reduce the parastatal subsidy overhang, clearly Zimbabwe watchers will be disappointed that government was not prepared to bite the bullet and reduce its expenditure in real terms. The whole objective of the structural adjustment programme is to channel resources away from the public sector and towards the private sector. Government seem reluctant to do this.

Possible areas of more significant reduction would have been in the Ministry of Political Affairs, whose usefulness has been a matter of much speculation, and possibly the Ministry of Defence.

The lifting of the State of Emergency was, after all, in cognisance of the fact that the regional security situation has largely stabilised.

For the average taxpayer, however, the gains outweighed the losses. The \$1,100 tax free bonus introduced last year continues, with LLET [expansion unknown] being abolished in November and changes to the scale leading to less tax for everyone earning up to \$45,00 annually; no tax is now paid until a taxpayer earns a minimum of \$3,600 annually. Consumers will also gain from the changes to sales tax where a three tier system replaces the old two tier. The tax concession on motor vehicles would make more sense if the cars were more available.

For small and medium size companies who are responsible for creating much of the increased employment, the minister's proposal to abolish the 100 percent special initial allowance and instead allow a 50 percent depreciation on reducing balance, will increase tax commitments and act as a disincentive. Although the basic income tax rate for companies will be reduced to 45 percent from the current 50 percent, the effect of the new proposal, which will come into effect from April next year, can only be adverse.

* Commercial Banks Employees Continue Strike

90AF0635D Harare THE HERALD in English
28 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] The strike by employees of the country's five commercial banks entered its second day without a breakthrough in negotiations held throughout the day yesterday to resolve the pay dispute.

The striking workers have been converging in the First Street mall since the industrial action began. Negotiations yesterday between the workers' representatives, the Zimbabwe Society of Banking Officials, and the Bank Employers' Association of Zimbabwe were joined by officials from the Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare. No comment was available from the meeting.

Thousands of employees of the five commercial banks—Standard Chartered, Barclays, Credit and Commerce, ANZ Grindlays and Zimbabank—went on strike on Thursday morning in support of pay claims after collective bargaining reached a deadlock.

An appeal by ZISBO's president, Cde Loderk Mapfumo, on Thursday evening to the striking workers to return to work while their grievances were being looked at was ignored yesterday as the workers in Harare converged for a second day in the Mall.

Throughout the country, other commercial bank workers were also reported to be continuing with the strike.

On Wednesday the Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, Cde John Nkomo, told Parliament that the Banking Employment Council was among four employment councils on which deadlock had been reached.

The others were the employment councils for the railways, catering and construction industries.

He said the bank employees were demanding a 26 percent increase. The employers were offering 16 percent.

* Cuban Educational Cooperation Praised

90AF0635F Harare THE SUNDAY MAIL in English
29 Jul 90 p 3

[Text] The Ministry of Higher Education has expressed its indebtedness to the Cuban government for its cooperation with Zimbabwe in the area of human resources development.

Speaking at a cultural evening to mark the 37th anniversary of the assault of the Moncada Garrison at the Cuban embassy in Harare last week, the Minister of Higher Education, Cde David Karimanzira, said his ministry was particularly pleased with the Zimbabwe-Cuba Teacher Education programme.

"I am pleased to say that the first intake of more than 200 students who started in 1986 is due to complete the degree programme in September 1991. From then on students will be graduating every year until 1994 when the last intake will be completing," Cde Karimanzira said.

He said there were currently 1,000 Zimbabwean students in Cuba on the programme, majoring in chemistry, physics, mathematics, biology and geography, all leading to the award of a degree.

"These students will not only bring home their professional qualifications, but the culture and determination of the Cuban people which will enrich our own socio-cultural environment," he said.

* TU Official Reviews Labor Relations Status

90AF0635E Harare THE HERALD in English
30 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions [ZCTU] and the Employers' Confederation of Zimbabwe [EMCOZ] will have to move in to resolve outstanding pay disputes between workers and management, the ZCTU's secretary-general, Cde Morgan Tsvangirai, said yesterday.

Cde Tsvangirai said a ZCTU general council held at the weekend had decided to have a post-mortem on the collective bargaining on this year's salary increments.

"There are about five or six deadlocks still to be settled. The ZCTU and EMCOZ will be playing some role to settle these disputes," said Cde Tsvangirai.

The margins of dispute between workers and management were not "very" wide.

The post-mortem will be conducted at a workshop to be held this week and to be attended by affiliate trade unions.

Commenting on strikes, Cde Tsvangirai said they were a natural development of a process of sound labour relations which was in its initial stages.

"Although we accept that it (strike action) is disruptive, we have to educate both workers and management to understand the collective bargaining process."

The ZCTU secretary-general also made comments on various issues from the Budget to the lifting of the state of emergency.

The Budget was "an about-turn" policy change by government.

"It is a round-about turn of political and economic policy to a situation where markets are going to be the dominant determinant," he said.

It had long-term negative effects "insofar as long-term development which will come from external borrowing."

However, it had short-term benefits in terms of tax concessions and creation of a positive business environment.

Cde Tsvangirai welcomed the lifting of the state of emergency, saying that the decision allowed the rule of law to prevail.

The question to be addressed, according to Cde Tsvangirai was how to get a police force which had been used to operating under the state of emergency for 25 years to adapt to operating in terms of the rule of law.

He also said the ZCTU will hold its annual national congress next September.

The 3-day congress, to be held in Bulawayo from 14 to 16 September, would be the organisation's first working congress.

About 200 accredited delegates are expected to deliberate on papers which are currently under preparation and which will address socio-economics issues.

* President Announces General Amnesty

90AF0635A Harare THE HERALD in English
23 Jul 90 p 1

[Text] President Mugabe has announced a general amnesty to prisoners convicted of dissident-related

activities, infanticide, former PF-Zapu [Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People's Union] political fugitives and also granted a general remission.

The amnesty—the second to be granted by Cde Mugabe since becoming Executive President in December 1987—was given to consolidate reconciliation and unity among the people of Zimbabwe, and to mark the country's 10th anniversary of independence.

In a statement issued in Harare yesterday, President Mugabe said the amnesty had been granted in terms of Section 31 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 7) No. 23 of 1987.

Dissidents and their collaborators convicted for offences under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act before 30 June 1988 would be pardoned.

Former members of PF-Zapu who had left the country or continued to remain outside to avoid prosecution for promoting or furthering the objectives or interests of PF-Zapu before 30 June 1988 would also be pardoned.

Other people who qualified for the amnesty are members and former members of the security forces who committed offences during anti dissident operations by the security forces, if that offence was committed in good faith for the purpose of or in connection with the restoration or maintenance of good order and public safety in Zimbabwe or any part thereof.

Explaining the words "Security Forces" Cde Mugabe said they referred to the Defence Forces of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Republic Police, Central Intelligence Organisation and other organisations employed by government on anti-dissident operations.

Criminals who on 19 April this year still had 12 months or less of their sentences to serve but had already served not less than a third of their jail terms would also be released.

Women convicted of infanticide (child murder) and related offences on or before 18 April this year if the death of the child occurred within 3 months after birth, will also be pardoned.

Politically motivated offenders convicted of crimes other than murder from 14 February this year "with the purpose of promoting or furthering the interests of any political party or political organisation," will also be pardoned.

The amnesty does not include habitual criminals serving extended imprisonment terms, those who escaped from prison on or before 18 April and were still at large on 19 April or for other specified offences.

For those with suspended sentences, "... the suspended part of the sentence will remain of full force and effect and will be liable to be served if such conditions are contravened."

* Details of Land Purchase Plans Given

90AF0635C Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE-FARMERS GAZETTE in English 27 Jul 90 p 23

[Article by Regis Nyamakanga]

[Text] The Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) has confirmed that the government plans to acquire 6 million hectares of commercial farmland under the resettlement programme for \$540 million, far below an estimated market value of \$3 billion.

Mr Dave Hasluck, CFU director, told the Institute of Bankers of Zimbabwe's 23rd Winter Banking School in Nyanga at the weekend that the National Land Policy Document, drawn up by the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement, has recommended that 6 million hectares of commercial farmland be transferred for resettlement as soon as possible.

This would leave a commercial farming area of 4.9 million hectares, the majority of which would be in regions 1, 4 and 5.

According to the ministry, the land in these regions was adequate for commercial farmers to continue to produce at current levels of output, ensure food security and maintain exports.

"In summary this would mean having transferred 25 percent of the commercial farming area since 1980, a further 53 percent of the remaining area would be transferred at fixed prices for what President Mugabe refers to and promises as a massive land resettlement programme," Mr Hasluck said.

He said Cabinet had spent some time last month considering the draft National Land Policy document, which was prepared without consultation with the commercial farmers.

Mr Hasluck said the National Land Policy document was full of ill-conceived and rhetorical recommendations on the manner in which the commercial farmers would be dealt with in future.

As reported in our issue last week, it was proposed that Section 6 (1) (a) to (d) of the Land Acquisition Act, which currently allows the transfer of land without ministerial approval, would be amended so that all land transfers would have the authority of the Minister of Agriculture.

Land transfers under the Act would include sales in execution and insolvency, barter deals, donations, land exchanges and transfers of land to a company by buying out another company's trade mark.

He said it was proposed that the government should control agricultural land prices in Zimbabwe.

Both the Ministries of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and Public Construction and National Housing, would meet to decide on the two options that

government should adopt: either price fixed at realistic average price level per hectare by natural region, or prices fixed on the basis of the original purchase price, including the value of permanent improvements, said Mr Hasluck.

Once a fair price for land was established, it was recommended that the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development should consider removing capital gains tax for farmers who sold farms to another one, or invested in the agricultural sector.

To achieve both equity and efficiency, it was recommended that the government should immediately legislate against the ownership of more than one farm unit by individuals or companies, Mr Hasluck said.

"Against this background what should farmers be doing in the 1990s?" he asked.

"On the face of it, quit now while the going is good and get paid something for the farm before government cannot afford to pay anything.

"Perhaps we should wait for the Second 5-Year National Development Plan to be published on 1 January 1991 to see whether this radical approach has been ameliorated and whether in terms of the proposals to encourage foreign investment as part of the structural adjustment programme, the commercial farming sector is treated more favourable, as at present this is specifically excluded," he said.

*** Domestic Workers Given 15-Percent Increase**

90AF0635B Harare *THE HERALD* in English
27 Jul 90 p 4

[Text] Domestic workers have been awarded a 15 percent wage increase across the board.

The Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, Cde John Nkomo, said yesterday that the increase was awarded after careful consideration and consultations.

Cape Verde

* PAICV, Opposition Confront Each Other

90AF0602A Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese
17 Aug 90 pp 16-17

[Article by Jose A. Salvador; first paragraph is O JORNAL introduction]

[Text] The opposition in Cape Verde, led by the Movement for Democracy [MPD], is riding the crest of the wave. The popular enthusiasm for the movement has exceeded the most optimistic expectations of its leaders, who are already talking about winning the elections. However, Pedro Pires and the PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde], in power for 15 years, still hold several trump cards, including [control of] the media, to dictate the rules of the game.

Late in the afternoon, in the village of Sal Rei, on the island of Boavista, groups of citizens were going to the open air cinema, at the edge of the main square.

This time they were not going to see another kungfu or spy movie, but to listen to the leader of the Cape Verdean opposition, attorney Carlos Veiga, former militant of the PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde] and currently leader of the MPD.

About 150 people were gathered in the outdoor amphitheater when Carlos Veiga stressed that "everyone supported the PAIGC because they wanted independence and, today, independence is an indisputable fact. These 15 years," he explained, "have certainly been better than the 500 years of colonialism, but many of our hopes have not been satisfied."

A member of the Public Safety Police attended the rally, which was very orderly, with applause for the severest criticism of the PAICV and cheers for the opposition movement.

To an independent observer who has known Cape Verde since the decolonization, today's reality is astounding; it has taken not only the government party but the opposition movements—the MPD, the UCID [Independent and Democratic Cape Verdean Union] (liberal, strongly U.S.-influenced), and the UTIC [expansion unknown] (Maoist)—by surprise.

The PAIGC/PAICV, founded about 30 years ago, is going through an identity crisis, provoked by 15 years in power without any legal opposition and by the changes occurring in the world. The fall of the regimes in Eastern Europe created chinks in the walls of the authoritarian regime.

The popular enthusiasm for the MPD has generated a wave of optimism among its leaders, who are already allowing that they can win the next elections.

However, neither Pedro Pires, present secretary general of the PAICV, nor his party has lost control of the situation and they still hold some trump cards to play at the right time during the election process.

Three Obstacles

The Cape Verdean leaders have worn out the excuse of colonialism to justify the setbacks and retrogression that are occurring today in Cape Verde. After 15 years of independence, they have led the Cape Verdean society to three kinds of roadblocks: economic, with extremely high inflation and unemployment rates, not reflected in the official statistics; political, with an authoritarian regime that cannot cope with dissent and the changes in the world; and cultural, resulting from the lack of freedom in a single-party system.

In the economic area, the development model adopted since independence, characterized by the state monopoly in sectors vital to the economy, such as transportation, banking, and insurance, and strong intervention in other areas, such as agrarian reform, fishing, education, health, etc., has failed. The government itself has perceived this failure, to the point that it recently decided to open banking, insurance, and other sectors to private enterprise, to promote the rapid expansion of the Cape Verdean economy.

Until 1985, for example, the official line of the PAIGC/PAICV was to reject the development of tourism, for ideological reasons, fearing contamination by malign capitalist ideas, and for social reasons, feeling that tourist activity would foster prostitution and other evils. This ideological choice, which stifled tourism, did not prevent the epidemic of juvenile prostitution which is occurring now in Mindelo, on Sao Vicente, or in Praia, on Santiago, but it robbed the economy of the benefits provided by the tourist industry.

With no natural resources to speak of, as evidenced by the shortage of water, Cape Verde cannot afford the luxury, imposed by the ideological puritanism of its leaders, of disregarding tourism as a factor for development. This posture has been abandoned, but there are still many bureaucratic restraints that discourage potential domestic and foreign investment in the tourist sector.

During these 15 years, we have seen a widening gap between the leaders and the people, who are finding it more and more difficult to obtain "cachupa." The opulent life style of the rulers in the capital contrasts with the miserable living conditions, on the thin edge of survival, of the majority of the population on the other islands of the archipelago. Emigration is continuing, and is no greater only because the doors of the receiving countries are barred. Domestically, to the extent that employment is declining on large public works (for which the wages are poor and the government paychecks are delayed), thousands of men and women are now jobless, with no prospects for a better future. So there is a new phenomenon: migration, as we are witnessing now with the flow

of people from Santo Antao to Sao Vicente. If it were not for the remittances from the emigrants, there would be chaos in Cape Verde when international assistance begins to decline.

Crisis of Mindelo

The case of Sao Vicente symbolizes the failure of the development model outlined by the PAICV. From colonial times, Mindelo, the island's capital, has been the liveliest city in the country, and its port has played an essential role in development.

Today the port is moribund, virtually abandoned. Since independence, Sao Vicente has only gained a shipyard for naval repairs, which has been a "white elephant" for the Cape Verdean economy. Planned for 6,000-ton ships, it can only handle ships half that weight, which has limited its clientele and its ability to compete with the shipyards of Dakar.

The tobacco factory, the biscuit factory, Shell, and one or two other industries are insufficient for an island where the unemployment rate is calculated at 80 percent of the active population. The migration of people from Santo Antao (at grips with an agricultural crisis) to Sao Vicente has swelled the city of Mindelo, which is ringed with miserable shanty towns. Business has felt the crisis and store counters and shelves are emptier today than they were six years ago, as a result of the generalized loss of purchasing power.

Night life has come to a halt. The port area is lifeless at night; while the Mindelan takes refuge in his tin shack. Mindelo is a city in pain, nostalgic for its golden years and its *joie de vivre*. The celebrations of yesteryear have given way to lamentation. The "morna" [Cape Verdean ballad] is increasingly sad and forlorn.

The opposition is not directly accusing the government of corruption, but of poor management of the international aid and poor strategic choices. Hence the opposition is advocating private initiative in all areas, from the economic sector to education and health, and criticizes the government's economic strategy, which was based on the development of three islands—Sal, Santiago, and Sao Vicente—to the detriment of the others: Santo Antao, Sao Nicolau, Boavista, Maia, Fogo, and Brava. According to the MPD, the PAICV has done a poor job of developing the first three, as Sao Vicente demonstrates, and has ignored the rest of the country.

Death of One-Party System

Strengthening private enterprise obviously requires liberalization of the political regime, and this is what the MPD is demanding most insistently. The overthrow of the Eastern European regimes, the roadblocks confronting the Cape Verdean society, and international pressure have made this liberalization inevitable, but Pedro Pires intends to keep it firmly in hand.

In the recent cabinet shakeup, the chief executive did not disguise his intent, naming Maj Armando Silva as secretary of the interior. Maj Silva, general commander of the Security Forces and considered a "hard liner," has not been installed yet because charges of torture and brutal treatment of a Cape Verdean citizen are pending against him. The first of the suits has been running its course in the Military Court since 1982, but the nature and function of this institution do not offer any assurance of an impartial judgment. Although the harshness of the regime has not reached Bissau's level (with arbitrary arrests and executions) or that of Luanda or Maputo (capitals of countries where similar procedures are observed and which are still experiencing civil wars), the liberties, rights, and guarantees of Cape Verde's citizens have not always been respected during these 15 years of independence.

In 1976 and 1981, there were waves of arrests in the name of state security. The most dramatic incident occurred in Santo Antao, in August 1981, when about two dozen people were arrested, among thousands of demonstrators protesting the agrarian reform. After being tortured by the political police, they were tried in the Military Court and sentenced to several years in prison. Aristides Pereira, president of the republic, later commuted the sentences and there have been no political arrests in Cape Verde for several years.

The issue of agrarian reform and, later, of the legalization of abortion have been points of friction between the state and the Church, apparently cleared up with the visit of Pope John Paul II to Cape Verde this year.

During these 15 years, however, the Church has become one of the principal voices criticizing the regime, from the pulpit and, particularly, in the columns of the newspaper TERRA NOVA, edited by Brother Antonio Fidalgo, a former PAIGC militant. The prestige and the audience won by the priest have given him the aura of a presidential candidate, a possibility which he has rejected up to now.

The opposition will not have a more credible candidate to run against Aristides Pereira, not even if it opts to support the current presiding judge of the Supreme Court, who is accused by some sectors critical of the opposition of having collaborated in the judicial repression of the Santo Antao demonstrators.

For his part, the present president of the republic has divested himself of his party functions, seeking to present himself as a "superparty" candidate, in the manner of Mario Soares and Mitterrand, the examples cited to justify his "divorce of convenience" from the PAICV. The opposition rejects this comparison, declaring that neither Soares nor Mitterrand had governed for 15 years under a single-party system.

So the PAICV has already taken all the political steps to revise the Constitution to institutionalize the multiparty system. The death of the single party is an irreversible fact.

Freedom of Information

With the institution of the multiparty system, the opposition is now demanding freedom of information and a reasonable calendar for elections, so it can get itself organized.

Regarding the calendar, the MPD wants to have the legislative elections held first, at the end of this year, and presidential elections only after that, unlike the PAICV, which will possibly seek to take advantage of the momentum of an Aristides Pereira victory to win the legislative elections.

On the international plane, Pedro Pires has also taken the preemptive step of proposing to register his party in the Socialist International, thus preventing the opposition from doing so.

This is certainly a strange move, considering that the PAIGC/PAICV has always rejected socialist references in its program and has always governed without a legal opposition.

Incidentally, the MPD has insisted on the dismantling of the political police, officially known as the Security Forces; it also distrusts the role to be played in the future by the so-called popular militia, which are still armed. The dissociation of the Armed Forces from the party is another concern of the MPD and an essential condition in establishing democracy and a state of law.

Some months ago, the MPD demanded the dismissal of Information Minister Hopffer Almada, accusing him of controlling and manipulating television, radio, and the newspaper VOZ DI POVO in favor of the PAICV. In remodeling his cabinet in July, however, Pedro Pires not only retained the minister but voiced his total confidence in him.

Today, in the interest of truth, it must be said that there has been a clear decline in the quality of these three media, independently of greater or lesser government control. This decline has also been observed in the cultural area, where such magazines as RAIZES and PONTO E VIRGULA have disappeared and nothing has replaced them.

The Cape Verdean culture is impoverished, as is Cape Verde itself. The current political process is complex, but it could open an era of progress, in which the opposition and the PAICV each have a part to play, for the benefit of all. Their leaders know that they are playing historic roles.

* UCID Head Discusses Party's Prospects

90AF0574A Praia VOZ DI POVO in Portuguese
2 Aug 90 p 5

[Interview with Mario Marques Gomes dos Santos, deputy secretary general of the Independent and Democratic Cape Verdean Union, by Gabriel Raimundo, in

Santiago, Cape Verde, date not given; first two paragraphs are VOZ DI POVO introduction]

[Text] Mario Marques Gomes dos Santos, an agricultural technical agent and native of Praia, has been a resident of Paco d'Arcos (Portugal) for 15 years. He is deputy secretary general of the Independent and Democratic Cape Verdean Union (UCID).

During a three-week visit to Cape Verde (he arrived on 15 July), Mario dos Santos granted us an interview in which he related the impressions he had gathered during his stay and the characteristics of his party. This interview will be duly complemented by an interview with John Wahnon, secretary general of the same political organization, who is now living in the United States. We have not yet been able to publish that interview in VOZ DI POVO because of the poor quality of the tape recording of Wahnon's conversation with our colleague during the secretary general's visit to Cape Verde.

[Raimundo] What is the reason for this visit to your native country?

[Dos Santos] I came to make some contacts at the party level. I had a meeting scheduled with other UCID leaders who live in the United States and in other countries. When I arrived, I met in Sal, as planned, with John Wahnon, secretary general of the party, who is a native of Sao Vicente. In Praia, I consulted with his brother, Oldegar Wahnon, and with Adriano Santos, both of whom live in the United States.

[Raimundo] Have you finished your business here?

[Dos Santos] My comrades have already gone to Fogo, Brava, and Sao Vicente, and Santo Antao is also in our plans. I am also thinking of going to Maio and, basically, we will cover all the islands, so that we can familiarize people with the lines of our program. I myself have had many contacts in Santiago.

[Raimundo] Tell us your impression of the current situation in Cape Verde, starting with Santiago.

[Dos Santos] I have not visited the other islands yet; the last time I traveled all over the country was in 1982.

In Santiago, in my opinion, the life is artificial. People do not have assured income, particularly in rural areas. There is an uncertainty to daily life. Work is irregular and the pay is inadequate.

Harmonious Democracy

[Raimundo] How has the UCID been received where it has been active?

[Dos Santos] We have had an excellent reception wherever we have gone, which proves that this is still more room for the UCID. This is the type of work that we are going to conduct. In Santiago, the UDIC is an underground party, because the government is in the capital and because of the Political Police, so we are not so

strongly implanted here as on the other islands. For this reason, we were surprised when many people told us that they already knew about the party. So we are sure that, with further militant action and better dissemination of our program, the UCID is going to be a great party. Even more so because we preach nonviolence and, as a party of Christian inspiration, we will do everything possible to see that democracy is installed in Cape Verde in a climate of peace and harmony.

[Raimundo] Is it your opinion, then, that there have been political police in Cape Verde?

[Dos Santos] Yes, to the extent that arrests have occurred because some people openly expressed their ideas and that a climate of fear has been created in the society.

[Raimundo] Do you feel that we have not had real democracy up to now?

[Dos Santos] Certainly not, because we understand that democracy exists when there are several parties in a country. Well, with Article 4 in the Constitution, it was impossible to have democracy in Cape Verde...

[Raimundo] What is your opinion of the calendar announced for the next elections?

[Dos Santos] If it is followed, the calendar is reasonable. We just do not agree that the presidential elections should be held this year because it is premature; it is a very hasty electoral act, which is contrary to the spirit of bringing about democracy, which is not achieved in haste.

[Raimundo] What is the UCID's policy on alliances?

[Dos Santos] We would like to see all the opposition parties united at this time, to put pressure on the government to establish the multiparty system. However, for reasons internal to our party, we have only formed a tactical alliance with the MPD [Movement for Democracy].

[Raimundo] Will it be a lasting alliance?

[Dos Santos] At least until clear and concrete conditions have been created in the country, for which we will continue to work body and soul—we do not want to return to a climate similar to the one in Cape Verde in late 1974...

Support from Emigrants

[Raimundo] What segments of the population are you counting on to achieve the objectives of the UCID?

[Dos Santos] Although it seems paradoxical, because we were previously accused of being a capitalist party, our following is strongest among the emigrants, workers abroad, and even here in the country we find that we have the greatest acceptance among the more disadvantaged classes. We have some support from intellectuals and a certain following among manufacturers, merchants, property owners, civil servants...

[Raimundo] Doesn't the fact that the UCID leadership is outside the country limit the party's capacity for action?

[Dos Santos] Actually, it is true that the party leadership has been outside the country since 1977 (scattered over Europe and America), but it is precisely for this reason that we are meeting in Cape Verde, to strengthen and organize our cadres and to open UCID offices in the country.

[Raimundo] Are you thinking of creating some kind of press organ to disseminate the party policy?

[Dos Santos] We have a news bulletin—NACAO CABOVERDEANA—published in Portugal by the UCID's Information Committee, which circulates among the emigrants. It is a monthly bulletin and has come out regularly since the party was founded in 1977.

Now, with the establishment of a multiparty system, we are also going to set up UCID structures in Cape Verde.

[Raimundo] Where does the process of legalizing the UCID stand?

[Dos Santos] Our secretary general has already delivered the necessary documents for legalization to the Supreme Court.

Party of Christian Inspiration

"In harmony with the convictions, faith, culture, habits and customs of the Cape Verdean people, the UCID guarantees that it will scrupulously and fully meet its obligations on behalf of humanity.

"The UCID aspires to a solid system of beliefs and practices with regard to all that is sacred to its people and which unites them in the same moral community, the Cape Verdean community." This is how the UCID defines itself in its Statutes and Programs, in which it further describes itself as a nationalist, antitotalitarian party, uniting the Cape Verdean people; a popular party, struggling for a free and participatory society.

In the preamble to the UCID's political platform, approved last April, it states that "democracy implies the direct and active participation of all citizens in selecting their governors and, in every instance, in influencing the decisions that these men make in the exercise of their offices. This participation requires responsibility, which the conscientious citizen cannot shirk. It is hoped that the indifference and complicity of many people in Cape Verde, which led to the totalitarianism of the present PAICV [African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde] regime, will be replaced by a spirit of constructive criticism, tolerance, and compassion, so that, in this way, united in a common effort, we will all, without exception, take up the work of national reconstruction" which Cape Verde rightly merits.

Ghana

* Discussions on Future Framework Begin

90AF0634A Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC
in English 6 Jul 90 pp 1, 8-9

[Article by Joe Bradford Nyinah, Sunyani]

[Excerpt] The first in a series of discussions to collect and collate views for a framework on the country's economic and political future opened at Sunyani in Brong-Ahafo yesterday.

The discussions organised by the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) is themed, "The District Assemblies and the Evolving Democratic Process."

Opening the discussion, the Leader of the Revolution, Chairman Jerry John Rawlings emphasised that to Ghanaians, democracy cannot simply mean holding elections periodically whilst the people continue to suffer poverty, misery illiteracy, hunger, poor health and unemployment.

He said any discussion on structures or processes of government cannot be divorced from the economic reality of providing for the basic human needs of society.

Chairman Rawlings said it is the firm view of the PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] that both national productivity as well as the effectiveness of political authority in Ghana depend on the strength of popular participation. [passage omitted]

* Japanese Equipment Aids Rural Development

90AF0634E Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC
in English 12 Jul 90 p 9

[Article by Joe Okyere: "Japanese Assistance to Ghana"]

[Text] The Japanese Government yesterday handed over equipment worth 420 million Yen (approximately \$3 million U.S. dollars) to Ghana to support a number of projects under the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD).

The equipment in the form of vehicles, motor bikes, cinema/video vans, generators and water equipment for hand-dug wells and rural sanitation programme were handed over by the out-going Japanese Ambassador to Ghana, Mr. Sugemi Ando to the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, Dr Kwesi Botchwey at a short ceremony in Accra.

The equipment are made up of 51 double-cabin pick-ups, 32 seven-ton cargo trucks, 7 three-ton cargo trucks, 11 cinema/video vans, 133 motor bikes and water equipment.

In a brief remarks before receiving the items, Dr Botchwey stated that the government intends to make the PAMSCAD a permanent feature of the Economic Recovery Programme [ERP].

Dr Botchwey said the Japanese grant is provided within the framework of the government's rural development strategy since they are meant for effective implementation, coordination, supervision and monitoring, as well as restoring some of the social services infrastructure and projects designed to meet the basic needs of vulnerable groups in the rural areas.

These projects include essential drug supply scheme to levels A and B health institutions, provision of about 2,000 wells, 6,000 improved toilet facilities to about 1,500 rural communities, rural shelter programme and purchase and distribution of food to second cycle schools.

He expressed the government's gratitude to the Japanese Government for her continuing support to Ghana's ERP and the PAMSCAD.

On his part, Mr Ando said the items were made available to support rural development projects which form part of the PAMSCAD under an agreement signed in April last year.

Mr Ando gave assurance of Japan's continued support in furthering Ghana's self-help efforts in the light of the ever-increasing cordial relations between the two countries.

* Japanese Grant Assists Rice Mill Renovation

90AF0634D Accra PEOPLE'S DAILY GRAPHIC
in English 11 Jul 90 p 1

[Article by Kojo Sam, Tamale]

[Text] Machinery and equipment for a massive rehabilitation of the Nasia Rice Company at Tamale, to make the mill produce quality rice which would compare favourably with most of the imported rice, have started arriving at Tamale, from the Tema Harbour.

Prominent among the items include a new parboiling plane which would enable the mill to [produce] about 200,000 bags of quality whole grain per year.

Others are eight heavy duty tractors, six boom sprayers, seven vehicles, four irrigation pumps, four reapers (small-scale harvesters), two each of power tillers and splashers, a traxcavator and quantities of agro-chemicals which would be used to offer correct extension services and agronomic practices to rice farmers who constitute a vital source of the company's raw materials.

Also included are several crates of spare parts to service the machines and equipment.

The rehabilitation is being carried out with a Japanese grant of 400 million yen under the Kennedy Round Two arrangement in Japan.

Mr Adam Zakariah, General Manager of the company, disclosed this in a briefing to the GRAPHIC when our

Northern Regional Correspondent visited the mill on Monday to observe the progress of work on the rehabilitation exercise.

At the factory premises, two Japanese engineers, assisted by Ghanaian technicians, were seen busily assembling most of the machines which came in knocked-down form. The job is expected to be completed in September, this year.

Mr Zakariah explained that the anticipated production target of 200,000 bags of quality rice would constitute about 75 percent of the total capacity of the mill.

The general manager said the factory could increase that capacity if the need arises but said, "we do not intend to stretch the machines too much so that the nation can enjoy their maximum life span."

Mr Zakariah added that the company would be in a position to buy as much rice as possible from the Bontanga Irrigation Project, near Tamale, the Irrigation Company of Upper Region (ICOUR) at Tono and from upland farmers to feed the mill.

Nigeria

* Ajaokuta Project Stalled by Debt Controversy

90AF0632A Lagos *THE GUARDIAN* in English
5 Aug 90 p 2

[Article by Nik Ogbulie: "Controversy Over 6.5b Naira Debt Stalls Ajaokuta Steel Project"]

[Text] Nigeria's hope of joining the select league of steel merchants next year may remain a mere dream if the controversy now ranging between her and the Soviet Union—the major contractor of the multi-billion naira Ajaokuta Steel Complex—remains unresolved.

The crux of the latest tangle is an alleged Nigeria's non-compliance with her debt obligations unofficially put at 6.5 billion naira. The two countries had made arrangements for debt repayment.

The Soviet Union stoically hold on to the claim that it has "adequately fulfilled its contractual obligation but the Nigerian government has refused to honour its debt obligations since 1986.

In the wake of the latest government move to go on with the project against advice regarding its viability, *THE GUARDIAN* ON SUNDAY learnt that a Nigerian higher representative in Moscow in a brief but "warm" briefing with the USSR host recently. [as published]

Dependable sources explained that the Soviet Union is claiming not to have been paid the outstanding debt or part of it since 1986 even though the Federal Government was said to have made lots of promises to that effect.

In view of the government's failure to liquidate its debt, Soviet Union officials have turned down a request by the finance minister for a five-year moratorium on the Ajaokuta Steel Complex.

Our sources hinted that a visit this month has been scheduled by the Soviet delegation which will be led by its deputy minister in readiness for another visit which may be made by that country's Minister for Foreign Economic Relations and other unnamed executives.

The purpose of the visit, it was gathered is to iron out thorny issues on the "stalled" steel project which has gulped over \$5 billion and still look very ready to take four times that much before reasonable production could be carried on.

THE GUARDIAN ON SUNDAY gathered that the meetings will be held in Lagos, Ajaokuta and Abuja as suggested by the Soviets.

Spirited efforts to ascertain the USSR claim met with stone walls as the press secretary to the minister, Mr Olugbayo Ogundeyo could not secure from the minister answers to questions fielded on any of the issues raised by the Soviets.

The office of the directors of External Finance and Multilateral Unit were not open for questions, although our sources identified them as the authentic areas to give the facts and figures on such external debt and payment.

Recently, a visiting four-man Soviet trade delegation led by deputy minister for foreign economic relations who also doubles as chairman of Soviet-Nigerian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Technical Co-operation and Trade, Mr Oleg Darylov had made a case for the mounting debt in Lagos after a brief meeting with government officials on the over 6.5 billion naira debt on the Ajaokuta Steel project.

Darylov told the Nigerian government then that "despite considerable difficulties arising from inadequate funding and lack of progress in settling the debt, the Soviet would do all they could to meet the target date set for it (December 1991)."

* Nation To Maintain OPEC's Oil Quota

90AF0628B Lagos *DAILY TIMES* in English
9 Aug 90 pp 1, 14

[Article by Biola Ogedengbe: "Nigeria Will Keep to OPEC's Quota"]

[Excerpt] Nigeria will keep to its crude oil quota of 1.61 million barrels per day under the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), allocation formula, in spite of the on-going Iraq-Kuwait conflict which may adversely affect oil supplies to the international markets.

Petroleum Resources Minister, Prof. Jibril Aminu, who gave this assurance at a Press conference, in Lagos yesterday, noted that the crisis between the two Gulf

countries, both OPEC members, had threatened the remarkably cordial atmosphere in which the 13 members of the organisation met last month in Geneva.

Professor Aminu recalled that decisions of the members to check over-production and violation of assigned quotas were easily arrived at and expressed the fear that the Gulf crisis might jeopardise the decisions reached at the last OPEC conference.

He, however, maintained that no matter what happened, Nigeria would always be guided by the provisions of OPEC statutes.

He added that the country was also totally opposed to any unilateral actions by any member-nation which would have the effect of altering the provisions of the most recent agreement reached at the conference.

Prof. Aminu revealed that he had, at the instance of President Ibrahim Babangida, contacted powerful OPEC ministers as well as OPEC's president, Sadek Boussena, from the first day of the crisis, on the need to preserve the integrity of OPEC and ensure that the conference decisions were not jeopardised.

He said: "We in Nigeria have always respected OPEC's decisions and solutions to problems and we firmly believe that in the present situation, the need for close co-operation among members is greater than at any other time." "If there is any need to review any aspect of OPEC's recent decisions, Nigeria's position is that OPEC, as a body, will certainly need to meet to discuss the matter and adopt a common position," he added.

At yesterday's Press conference, Prof. Aminu announced that he had, at a meeting on Tuesday, briefed the heads of the oil producing companies in the country on the development in the Gulf region.

The discussions at the meeting, according to him, included the possibility of varying production levels, as may be agreed with OPEC members, in response to further developments, "in this clearly-escalating crisis."

Brent, the North Sea crude which is of the same quality with Nigeria's Bonny light crude, sold for \$28.6 per barrel in early trading on Tuesday up from Monday's \$26.5 per barrel. [passage omitted]

*** Survey Shows Public Dislike for Army, Police**

90AF0628A Lagos *THE GUARDIAN* in English
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[Article by Felix Nyong: "Nigerians Against Military Regimes"]

[Text] Governments attempt of feeling the pulse of the nation on some national issues through a nationwide opinion poll may have among other things revealed the people's displeasure at military regimes and coups.

By implication, Nigerians, through the survey, may have overtly expressed their disgust for military aberrations or indeed for any government that may want to perpetuate itself in power against the people's wish.

The exercise, conducted by the Research and Statistics unit of the Federal Information Ministry sought to collate the views of Nigerians from 18 years and above on some national issues including the police image, coup detats, National Directorate of Employment (NDE), and Mass Transit Programme.

The ministry's pilot exercise carried out in 1988 which sought views of Nigerians on population control was said to have helped the government in formulating the nation's population policy of one woman, four children by which the government hopes to stem the rising tide of sky-bound population—the scourge of most Third World countries.

The target audience covered in this year's exercise which lasted from July 9-30 was 15,000 citizens covering all the 453 councils of the country.

Although the polls results were yet to be fully analysed as at last week, some of the 22 supervisors who headed the exercise in each of the states and Abuja had reached a clear-cut consensus gathered on the field across the nation as they compared notes shortly after handing in their questionnaires.

According to one government official: "The results of the exercises were as revealing as they were interesting." It was also confirmed that the police force lived up to its unenviable reputation as a centre of corruption.

The official said it was shocking to find out that the force's already battered image was further pummelled by most citizens across the nation, particularly in rural areas. One of the officials pointed out that even the wives of police officers interviewed were very frank as they roundly condemned the pervasive corruption their men had imbibed as a way of life.

Some of the respondents, according to sources, went a step further by calling on the government to sack the present corps of officers in the force. Said one official: "If the general consensus of Nigerians on the image and performance of the police is revealed to most of the officers, some of them would weep as almost none of the interviewees said anything commendable about the force, even in far-flung communities."

The military was also not spared in the exercise. *THE GUARDIAN* ON SUNDAY gathered that most citizens were reticent on the issue of coups d'tat, but when they were assured that the government was genuinely interested in their views, poured their hearts berating the "khaki boys" for the nation's multifarious problems.

Some of the respondents called for a complete disbandment of the army to forestall further coups as their continued usurpation of political power had given the nation the tag of a banana republic.

Surprisingly too, the polls showed that most interviewees from states which had produced the nation's military leaders through coups were unsparing in their criticism of coups and military regimes.

These respondents were said to have called for total disbandment of the army even though their sons had shot their ways into the nation's political limelight.

Perhaps, most revealing of the issues tackled in the polls was the rural dwellers' opinions on the National Directorate of Employment (NDE)—the government's principal organ set up to wage war on the seemingly intractable problem of unemployment.

Most of the officials who covered different states brought back reports of the employment agency's abysmal performance in the rural communities across the nation.

According to one official: "In some rural areas we were informed by the people that they don't know and have not benefitted in any way from any of the NDE's programme."

Another source said that despite the agency's yearly chest-beating on its perceived success, most citizens polled said it may have made monumental leaps in tackling urban unemployment but the agency was yet to make any appreciable impact in the rural areas.

Sources at the ministry told THE GUARDIAN ON SUNDAY that the polls had gulped nearly 100,000 naira. However, Mr. Joe Odiase, the ministry's head of research and statistics said it was still too early to compute the cost of the project, adding that the data was yet to be fully analysed and printed.

The opinion poll also shed some light on the public's perception of the performance of the Mass Transit Programme—the government's panacea to the high cost and dwindling means of transportation. Most respondents, particularly illiterates in the local communities who spoke through interpreters according to sources in some states, were unaware of the existence of the programme.

The result of the three-week exercise which also had Professor D.C.E. Ugwuegwu, psychologist at the University of Ibadan on the team as project consultant is expected to roll off the press in October.

Last year's exercise had focused on Mass Mobilisation for Social Justice and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), the Directorate of Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI), and the Structural Adjustment Programme.

It was not certain last week whether the results of the polls would be made public. But the Presidency and the four institutions covered in the exercise are expected to have the results.

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